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Corporatism Revisited 
Salinas and the Reform of the Popular Sector 
The installation of a new priista administration in Mexico, albeit with claims of 
fraud over the election of Ernesto Zedillo as President with some 50% of the 
vote,1 provides an opportune moment to assess the success of the party reform 
project between 1988-1994. The election of Carlos Salinas de Gortari to the 
Mexican presidency in July 1988 was remarkable for many reasons. The most 
outstanding feature of his victory was the narrow margin he was awarded in the 
final analysis - 50.36% of the votes. This bare majority was a massive blow to 
a party accustomed to gaining 70% or more in presidential elections, and was all 
the more significant since large sections of the electorate did not believe the 
results. It remains a moot point whether Salinas beat his closest rival, 
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas of the coalition FDN (Frente Democratico Nacionalbut 
it is widely accepted that he did not obtain the majority with which he was 
awarded the presidency in 1988. Furthermore, not only was the PRI (Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional) vote the lowest officially recorded, but the 
abstention rate was the highest; thus, the actual numbers of Mexicans supporting 
the incoming president at his inauguration, even by official estimates, was less 
than 30%.2 The priista political machine that had succeeded in turning out the 
vote on most occasions had failed on this occasion and had been shown wanting 
in a spectacular way.3 Given this scenario, the argument for party reform 
appeared irrefutable if the regime was to recoup its lost legitimacy.4 The party 
in government (to distinguish between the now unpopular phrase amongst PRI 
politicians, 'the government party') was losing its edge over other political parties 
and, given the presidentialist character of the regime and the relationship between 
government and party, the reform had to be instigated by the federal president 
rather than the party president. The popular protest votes on the left and the 
business community on the right had indicated that gaps had appeared on both 
sides of the political divide; for the first time the PRI was under attack by 
organised groups from both sides, rather than just the right as was customary 
(Morris, 1992). 
Mexico is frequently referred to as a state corporatist system with the ruling 
party controlling the terrain of corporatism (see below). Thus, if Mexico is to 
become a genuinely competitive pluri-party system, the PRI has to transform 
itself into a party able to compete on those terms. Consequently, corporatism has 
to be either disbanded or transferred to another non-party terrain. There are those 
who would argue that PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidadidad), the 
poverty alleviation and social welfare programme, represents an opportunity for 
such a transfer (Lomeli, 1993); certainly Solidarity, as it is popularly known, has 
been useful in reinforcing the party reform programme as will be seen below. 
The 1988 elections seemed to indicate that the democratisation sweeping the 
region since 1979 was at last having an impact on Mexico, which was also seen 
to be liberalising, both economically and politically. The debate around political 
reform has also included a discussion of citizenship and the possible consolidation 
of civil society. In the Mexican context this necessarily entails an examination of 
the clientelistic networks which have smoothed the system's functioning for 
decades. It has been suggested that the differing degrees of political liberalisation 
evident in the country point to three emerging typologies: the authoritarian 
clientelism of old, semi-clientelism and pluralism (Fox, 1994). Fox argues that 
there is evidence which may suggest a slow democratisation towards pluralism 
seen in other countries. However, the lack of consistent change has led others to 
speculate about the renewal of authoritarian corporatism. At the outset of the 
Salinas administration commentators were interested in the possible rise of neo-
corporatism or modern corporatism (Bizberg, 1993; Harvey 1993), but, at the 
same time, the debate focusing on the possibility of 'democratisation' or political 
liberalisation seemed implicitly to assume that democratisation necessarily means 
a shift to a liberal/pluralist system rather than a shift to societal corporatism 
where the corporate groups would be constituted from below. Where there have 
been indications in this direction, e.g. the linking of the Partido Revolucionario 
Democratico (PRD), the successor to the FDN, with independent peasant groups 
(Harvey, 1990), it is used as evidence that the political culture is so steeped in 
corporatist traditions that the democratisation project is almost doomed before it 
begins. The emphasis on the liberal, pluralist model is reinforced by the supposed 
link between economic liberalism and political pluralism. 
In this paper the shifts in the corporatist project of the PRI during the Salinas 
years will be assessed and we will examine how these fit into a system where 
Mexico wants to be seen as a first world country.5 However, I will be arguing 
that the political project of the Salinas regime consistently took second place to 
economic reform and that there was a continued failure to establish clearly the 
rule of law; consequently, the system remained highly arbitrary and centred on 
the president. As a result of this continued arbitrariness, presidential pressure to 
democratise the PRI internally was not seen as fixed, but open to negotiation and 
U-turns - many of which were seen during the Salinas years, particularly 
regarding party reform.6 Furthermore, I will be arguing that the reform of the 
PRI lacked a clear organising principle and that Salinas, along with his appointed 
General Secretary of the PRI,7 failed to assert his authority over the process in 
the same way that he did in other areas; noticeably the pushing through of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The reform failed to make 
headway in the key areas of democratisation, the demise of clientelism, the 
control of caudillismo, the instigation of clear regulatory principles and the rule 
of law and it succeeded only marginally in promoting decentralisation. 
In fact, the form of decentralisation undertaken helped to reinforce centralism 
in some cases by forcing change at the local level which reflect the wishes of the 
centre (Eckstein, 1990). What we see instead in many regions and sectors was 
an attack on local bosses who are resistant to the changes promoted by Salinas in 
favour of the so-called natural leaders, resulting in the mobilisation of the old 
guard in defence of their vested interests. The stalling of the political project in 
the shape of a genuine reform of the PRI was aided by the opposition's failure 
to maintain the pressure on the President and his government. Whilst it can be 
argued that not pushing through far-reaching reform of the PRI might be 
politically expedient to a President who was committing his energies to a radical 
economic project, it left local PRI politicians in disarray and the most local 
branch of the party at the neighbourhood level unsure of what the party 
represented for them. 
This confusion is exacerbated by the lack of clear understanding of the role of 
PRONASOL and the relationship between the programme and local government. 
The PRI had been fortunate since the opposition, particularly the PRD, has also 
had its own problems; nevertheless, there was always the worry that the low-
income neighbourhoods could once again become problem areas for the PRI, 
particularly in the climate of political instability. The impact of these changes has 
also had a regional dimension. Different states were targeted in different ways 
regarding genuine elections, accountability of representatives and the distribution 
of PRONASOL's resources, all of which have had an impact on relations 
between local priistas and Mexico City reformers.8 Furthermore, the continued 
arbitrariness reinforced centralism, allowing the president more scope for shifting 
local politicians who refused to toe his line by using PRONASOL to leapfrog 
local PRI politicians. 
The aim in this paper is to analyse the extent and direction of party reform by 
examining the interface between central and local authorities, and how the 
changes are having an impact on the ground. First, we will assess the challenges 
facing Salinas at his inauguration before concentrating on corporatism itself. This 
discussion will begin with an analysis of the utility of the concept of corporatism, 
both as a manner of describing the 'traditional' Mexican political system and as 
a way of understanding the changes currently taking place. This will be followed 
by an examination of the reorganisation of the party's Popular Sector as it was 
changed to usher in new democratic structures only to be returned to its original 
form within two years. With an analysis of how this has worked at the local level 
through an examination of the shifts at municipal level in Guadalajara, we will 
see how these changes have been felt at the community level allowing us to assess 
the gap between the elite plans and the grassroots reality, as well as the tensions 
between different party and government institutions, notably PRONASOL. 
The Challenges 
Salinas embarked on his sexenio facing a good many challenges, some which he 
had to confront immediately. The realignment as the economy shifted from 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) to export oriented industrialisation (EOI) 
had created a new economic environment of privatisation and a reduced role for 
the state (Morris, 1992). Since Salinas was clearly committed to liberalising the 
economy, a major problem was how to mitigate the contradiction between the 
economic model and social needs, especially since the austerity measures of the 
1980s had helped fuel the popular protests which contributed to undermining the 
PRI's hegemony in 1988. Amongst the challenges, we can identify a need to 
restructure the unions, address the problems of social inequality which would be 
compounded by substantial rural-urban population shifts in the wake of NAFTA, 
the need to act on the increasingly important issue of human rights, the pressure 
to increase productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors, lack of 
investment, the need to consider church-state relations and the pressure for 
electoral reform; much of this implicitly meant assessing the role of the PRI 
itself. 
However, it was not just these material issues; Salinas also had to deal with 
a challenge of rhetoric and discourse. The President had to incorporate the 
growing rhetoric on citizenship and democratisation, which took the issues 
beyond the narrow realm of formal institutions and which had formed the basis 
of many opposition demands; most particularly he had to address the issue of 
rights over favours. The demand-making by popular movements during the 1980s 
had become politicised and the protestors had gone on to promote citizens' rights 
rather than clientelistic favours, clearly showing that material goods alone no 
longer satisfied many Mexicans, who now wanted accountable representatives; 
the old order of authoritarian clientelism was showing the strain.9 The response 
of the in-coming administration to the challenges and pressures facing it have 
been multiple, with economic reform being prioritised. Whilst the economy was 
no longer in the deep crisis of 1982, there remained many serious issues to be 
confronted.10 
Secondly, in response to the popular protest organisation, the government 
needed to tackle service provision, unemployment and housing; even in official 
statistics it is recognised that about a third of Mexicans live in poverty. In 
response to these pressures, Salinas chose the following areas for attack: the 
economic model, which was to underpin all other social and political reform, 
consisted of an enthusiastic embracing of neo-liberal economic policies, possibly 
best illustrated by the massive campaign around the signing of NAFTA. On the 
social front an effort was made to undermine the strength of urban popular 
movements with the establishment of PRONASOL, aiming to show that the 
government was tackling questions of social inequality. Finally, directly 
institutional political questions were tackled with three electoral reforms and the 
reorganisation of the corporatist structures of the PRI.11 
Whilst Salinas was lauded for his economic management of the country, 
political successes were less easy to identify. At the same time, the pressure for 
political liberalisation eased, with the disarray of the opposition, particularly on 
the left, and the relative quiescence of civil society after the mobilisations of the 
1980s, the events in Chiapas in 1994 notwithstanding. Furthermore, the 
government social welfare programme, PRONASOL, succeeded in reducing 
some of the strains coming from demands for services. It could be argued that 
ideally Salinas would have liked to see the demise of the corporate structures of 
the PRI, indicated by his rhetoric of 'party of individuals', but that he was 
unwilling to embark on this high risk strategy when he still needed the old-
guard's support for voter mobilisation and a quiescent labour force during 
economic liberalisation. Equally, it is possible to see the advantages of not 
attacking the corporate structures directly since they appeared to be withering 
away anyway; over the previous two sexenios the number of top politicians to 
have come through the corporate structures had decreased and Salinas himself 
was not a 'party man' - nor is his successor Zedillo. However, we must be wary 
about any notions about the natural demise of corporatism; whilst it has 
apparently become less important for career politicians and the party has been 
weakened, corporate structures were being revitalised at the base during the 
Salinas sexenio as a way of incorporating the disenchanted through PRONASOL. 
Whilst moves towards political liberalisation could be identified, more 
especially at the local level (cf Rodriguez and Ward, 1994; Eckstein, 1990), there 
were also clear increases in repressive and authoritarian measures. In the latter 
half of the sexenio there was a closing off of access to decision-making arenas for 
popular protest organisations, the concept of the convenios all but disappeared,12 
the government exhibited authoritarian heavy handedness in its dealing with many 
labour disputes (Bulmer-Thomas et al, 1994) and, despite showing progressive 
tendencies by establishing the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
(CNDH), it then showed a less liberal attitude by deciding that this organisation 
could neither investigate labour relations nor electoral disputes - two of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary Mexico and where there have been 
considerable problems of human rights abuses.13 
It is evident then that Salinas confronted many of the challenges facing him in 
1988, but it has been difficult to detect a coherent long-term political strategy. 
This lack of planning is consistent with the PRI tradition of ad hoc responses in 
the face of crisis. However, it seems difficult to see genuine democratisation 
(even of the self-limiting sort) when there are such regional and sectoral 
disparities, and when political negotiations force the population to accept the 
right-wing PAN as the only electoral alternative.14 And had the PAN won 
elections, it is not clear that it would have followed policies to extend the notion 
of rights to the socio-economic arena any more than the PRI, nor would it be any 
more the guarantor of democratisation.15 Nevertheless, the strong showing of the 
PAN at local and regional level has allowed some PRI politicians to use this as 
evidence that the PRI is committed to a plural, multi-party system; ie the very 
existence of opposition government proves the democratic credentials of the PRI. 
This democratisation argument will perhaps be supported should opposition state 
governments be able to instigate new electoral laws which will make it difficult 
for the PRI to reassert itself with electoral alchemy at the regional level; as yet 
we have little empirical evidence with the first gubernatorial elections under new 
state electoral laws in Baja California happening only in 1995. 
Corporatism: myth or reality? 
Corporatism has been used to describe the political systems of many countries 
this century, with its first manifestation being closely tied to authoritarian states, 
particularly the fascist states of Italy and Portugal. However, it is worth pausing 
a moment to consider it as an analytical concept since it is not a monolithic 
notion, but one which embodies many variants. It is important to be clear what 
we mean if the Mexican political system is to be considered corporatist and what 
the current reforms tell us regarding its development in the Mexican context. 
Philippe Schmitter has given us the well-used conceptualisation: 
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, 
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of their 
demands and supporters. (Schmitter, 1979, p. 13) 
Schmitter found it necessary to distinguish between two strands of 
corporatism, state and societal. Both correspond to the organisational structures 
outlined above, the fundamental difference between the two corporatisms being 
the way in which these organisations evolve. Societal corporatism is constituted 
from below when organisations emerge from within civil society and become too 
powerful for the authorities to ignore. Consequently they are given formal roles 
within the state, as happened in Germany and Scandinavia. State corporatism 
'tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial sub-units are 
tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power' (ibid, p. 22). Amongst the 
many characteristics attributed to state corporatism, perhaps the most important 
for our purposes here is that 'party systems are dominated or monopolised by a 
weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and more 
narrowly recruited and are such that political subcultures based on class, 
ethnicity, language, or regionalism are repressed', (ibid, p. 22). However, in the 
Mexican case, the terrain of corporatism was not exclusively the state but the 
party, with some groups becoming 'pillars of the party' whilst others are 
organised by the state, such as the business organisations (Purcell and Kaufman 
Purcell (1977)). 
There are three key organisations which are organised within the PRI: the 
labour sector (the Confederation de Trabajadores Mexicanos - CTM), the 
peasants (the Confederation Nacional Campesina - CNC) and the heterogenous 
popular sector (formerly the Confederation Nacional de Organizations 
Populares - CNOP, now Federation Nacional de Organizations y Ciudadanos 
- FNOC). However, these are not the only organisations to represent these 
constituencies; there are a number of workers' centrals such as the CROM 
(Confederation Regional Obrera Mexicana), the CROC (Confederation 
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos) and the COR (Confederation Obrera 
Revolucionaria), and there is a growing number of independent unions and 
peasant organisations, some of which have supported the PRI and others which 
support the opposition. 
This has led some to argue that Mexico is not corporatist (Stevens, 1977). 
However, the majority of organisations engage in corporatist relations as 
described by Cawson (1985) and it has been pointed out that the fact that some 
groups have privileged access to the state resulting in others losing out and being 
excluded from the arrangement does not negate the corporatist character of the 
regime, as is the case in many countries (Williamson, 1989). Furthermore, whilst 
in the majority of cases corporatism separates groups, we must be aware of 
overlapping groups such as the women's sector and the revolutionary youth sector 
which are another two 'pillars' of the party which are underplayed. These could 
have 'dual members' (eg youth/CTM) but they focus on separate issues to 
minimise cross-sector alliances. Those organisations which operate within the 
PRI suggest a similarity with the Soviet 'monist' system where the 'constituent 
units are organized ... (within) ... a single party and granted a representational 
role within that party and vis-a-vis the state in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders, articulation of demands and mobilization 
of support'. (Schmitter, 1979, p. 16). Consequently the ad hoc development of 
corporatism in Mexico has embraced characteristics from both monism and state 
corporatism displaying its flexibility during its evolution. Despite this hybrid 
nature, it is still clear that the elite has used corporatist structures to organise and 
control society and whilst it may not conform to an 'ideal type', authoritarian 
corporatism is clearly a useful concept for an analysis of the Mexican political 
system and it is the re-working of this brand of authoritarianism which concerns 
us here. 
The emergence of a form of corporatism is hardly surprising. Several authors 
have identified its rise with a certain stage of capitalist development: Schmitter 
suggests that the abrupt demise of incipient pluralism in favour of state 
corporatism reflected the perception that social peace was key and should be 
fostered by repressing and excluding autonomous organisation rather than 
coopting it (Schmitter, 1979, p. 25; see also p. 38). As his macrohypothesis 
suggests (1979, p. 24), the corporate model was useful given the need to give 
Mexico a place in the capitalist system. Similarly, Williamson identifies some 
characteristics of countries which followed the authoritarian corporatist path, 
including underdeveloped economies where the agricultural sector was dominant; 
in these countries there was a marked immaturity of large national capitalists and 
a 'political system characterised by a dominant ruling elite or grouping and very 
limited mass participation' (1989, p. 42), which coincided with Mexico in the 
1930s. The development of corporatism in Mexico led to the rise of a strongly 
clientelistic system where cooptation was the preferred method of control, but if 
this failed there was little hesitation in using coercion and repression. The PRI 
dominated this system of exchange, with most important organisations and 
individuals trading favours through it and its major resource being access to state 
benefits; thus, the party was at centre stage in post-revolutionary Mexico. Whilst 
the omnipresent character of the PRI may not have been as real as some of the 
literature might suggest, the corporatist tentacles were far-reaching. However, 
there were always pockets of discontent and autonomous collective action that 
momentarily threatened the hegemony of the government party and the idea of 
apaz priista idyll is far from reality (Knight, 1990). Furthermore, there were, 
and remain, significant regional disparities regarding the degree of effectiveness 
and penetration of the PRI's corporatist structures. These disparities have become 
increasingly obvious during the 1980s when the opposition groups have clearly 
illustrated their regional strength, particularly in the north for the PAN with 
pockets of support in the west and southwest, and in Mexico City and Michoacan 
in particular for the coalition FDN in 1988, which has roughly translated into 
areas of support for the leftist PRD since then.16 
The corporatist system had already began to show signs of strain by the 1960s. 
The system had used the vertical structures of the CTM, the CNC and the CNOP 
as the channels through which clientelistic favours could be traded. Whilst this 
might have been functional in terms of including large sections, albeit not all, of 
the population in the 1940s and 1950s, by the 1960s the numbers who were 
excluded were becoming visible. The discontent over the distribution of the 
nation's wealth was growing and this contributed to the student demonstrations 
in 1968 which gained mass general support. These demonstrations were 
considered threatening enough to be violently repressed. The roots of the current 
wave of popular protest and consequent undermining of PRI hegemony can be 
traced to the events of 1968. Many of the activists who survived the events left 
Mexico City for the countryside and poor urban neighbourhoods to work directly 
with the poor and marginalised. The success of the COCEI in Juchitan also owed 
something to the students' new strategy, reinforcing older traditions of 
independent organisation (Foweraker, 1990a). In the 1970s a number of localised 
popular organisations emerged in a variety of contexts; new independent 
unionism, urban popular movements in many of the large cities where there had 
been a mushrooming of irregular settlements to cope with the large increase in 
rural migrants, and other types of collective action based around youth groups, 
women's groups, peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations. However, these 
were not a major threat to the PRI's dominance while they remained localised 
affairs, despite the fact that they were not participating within the corporatist 
structure. 
The PRI's structures allowed officials to identify and pick off the groups either 
through repression or, preferably, through cooptation. Generally this had not 
been too difficult between 1940 and 1960 since many of the demands were for 
material improvements which the system could absorb by dealing with them 
selectively, and Mexico's growth during this period was very healthy; this was 
not so easy once the economy faltered. Furthermore, increasingly the groups 
valued their independence from both the political system in general, refusing 
links with political parties, and from the PRI in particular. Moreover, these 
independent organisations started to coordinate their actions in umbrella 
organisations, coordinadoras, which were a greater threat to the PRI's system of 
dominance. Since the Mexican state project is based on achieving hegemony 
through neutralising potential political opposition, the system is particularly 
susceptible to alliance strategies on the part of grassroots organisations 
(Foweraker, 1988). More importantly, these new alliances were showing how far 
the PRI had slipped in terms of its organising capacity and the degree to which 
people were falling outside the net. Whilst it had been accepted previously that 
those who were escaping were of little importance, generally being the poorer 
and least vocal elements of society, these new coordinadoras were giving them 
a new national visibility and thus political weight. 
The PRI's organisational structure had grown in an ad hoc and uncoordinated 
way which allowed it to react to demands at the margins to absorb pressures. 
However, being flexible at the margins made it unwilling to organise radical 
change from within and the expansion of popular protest and the contraction of 
the economy stretched to its limits the PRI's capacity to absorb these pressures. 
Since the party had absorbed so many groups and organisations over the years, 
it did not have a coherent over-arching ideology or political position and, 
although it used the identity of revolutionary nationalism as an organising 
principle, this meant little in reality. 
Despite the disparate way in which the party had developed and the need of 
each president to distinguish himself from the previous one by distancing himself 
from that administration's policies, the last two sexenios have shown more 
consistency (and quite possibly the in-coming one will too). This consistency is 
most marked in the modernising of the economic arena. There is enough evidence 
to illustrate that the Salinas administration in particular has made radical changes 
through massive privatisation of parastatal companies, the opening up of the 
economy to foreign investors and free trade and the removal of most subsidies. 
Bizberg maintains that this modernisation is incompatible with corporatism, 
mainly because of the contradiction in the sphere of labour relations (1993, p. 
309). However, this supposes that corporatism necessarily includes an agreement 
whereby labour has a principal role as one of the 'functionally differentiated 
categories', which is not the case, although it has generally been a norm 
particularly in Europe. His assertion that the modernisation process demands the 
dismantling of corporatism ignores the tendencies towards a reorientation of 
corporatism away from the party, whose reform is a project riddled with 
problems, as Salinas has discovered. Bizberg does suggest an alternative scenario 
of 'neo-corporatism'; this is not to be confused with the neo-corporatism in the 
general literature, which is synonymous with European corporatism of the 1960s 
and 1970s where the corporatist groups have influence in policy design and 
implementation, which clearly would not fit the Mexican case. His version would 
be to remove some of the prerogatives of the strongest unions currently affiliated 
to the PRI, but, he argues, this would still be difficult to achieve since so many 
groups 'have found in the electoral arena new spaces for political expression.' 
(1993, p. 312). Yet, with the increased casualisation of labour, the future of 
labour organisations is fluid and Salinas was keen to promote Mexico as a 
country without major labour disputes and flexible in the global market place. His 
goal was therefore to keep people tied to the political system and maintain 
political stability whilst carrying out the economic restructuring. During the 
Salinas sexenio labour disputes were generally not tolerated, particularly those 
organised by independent unions, and the CTM was shown that it had to maintain 
support for the government or risk losing its privileged position. In this way it 
was an important ally for Salinas in his restructuring project, which in itself will 
erode the CTM and other 'official' unions in a deregulated market. 
Consequently, if the PRI is to lose its dominant position, which appears likely in 
the long term, there needs to be something to take its place to aid political 
stability; thus, the shift of corporatism to PRONASOL, which can organise 
people into vertical, hierarchical groups focusing on the social rather than the 
economic terrain, as will be discussed below, is particularly important. It is 
increasingly obvious that the party structure will continue to be a problem area 
for the government, but a continuation of the modernisation project can be 
guaranteed, with certain changes which are locked in under NAFTA and a social 
welfare project which contains discontent. 
Back to the Future: party reform in the 1990s 
That Salinas did embark on party reform is in no doubt, despite the lack of 
coherence this reform may have taken. However, it is not the first party reform 
to have taken place over the past thirty years and there is a continuous theme to 
these changes: how to get the grassroots back on board without alienating too 
many of the old cadres or the middle classes, particularly young professionals. 
The two most important changes of the post-war period are discussed here to 
indicate the history of some of the current tensions within the party. 
The first set of reforms which need to be mentioned were those enacted by the 
then PRI president, Carlos Madrazo, in the 1960s. He had emerged through the 
party ranks and was on the left of the party, keen to promote change which would 
take on board young people and 'natural leaders'. To invigorate the party, he 
wanted to introduce party primaries at the municipal level, but instead upset the 
clientelistic party setup of fiefdoms where the municipalities are the domain of 
state governors. Despite Madrazo's declared commitment to democratisation of 
the party, he too used undemocratic methods, such as over-riding decisions with 
which he disagreed and pushing through his own agenda. Inevitably his style and 
tactics were to have negative consequences and they forced a confrontation in 
which the president, Diaz Ordaz, had to choose between Madrazo and his 
opponents; in the event, the latter won, resulting in Madrazo being fired. Not 
long afterwards he and some close advisers were killed in a mysterious plane 
crash. The experience illustrates two main points. First, those who are 
supposedly committed to reform are also inclined towards building power bases; 
secondly, it is very difficult to change an organisational structure where vested 
interests permeate the whole apparatus as is the case with the PRI (Bailey, 1988). 
The other major reform that interests us here is the Ley Organica de Politica 
y Procesos Electorales (LOPPE) introduced in 1977 under Lopez Portillo. The 
major aim of this reform was to combat increasing levels of abstentionism by 
creating greater electoral competition. This was to be done by aiding parties on 
the left to counterbalance the power of the PAN, which was the main opposition, 
on the right. The Interior Minister of the day, Jesus Reyes Heroles, wanted to 
'create legitimate channels for opposition activity to prevent an accumulation of 
pressure that might explode in violence and reawaken what he often called 
"Mexico bronco"' (Bailey, 1988, p. 113). As such, his reforms consisted more 
in expanding Congress and facilitating smaller parties rather than in reforming 
the PRI. However, there were those who thought that this would weaken the 
party. Furthermore, we can see echoes in the logic of the current reforms: 
PRONASOL is trying to fulfil the same task by removing the pressures created 
by popular protest organisations from the oppositional arena and bringing them 
into the priista fold. 
Despite these attempts, there has been no general restructuring of the party 
since the 1940s, when it was finally fashioned as the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional with just three confederations (the CTM, the CNC and the CNOP) 
after the military sector had been disbanded. The events of 1988 indicated that 
reform of the party was necessary, but there was no clear idea as to where that 
reform would go. Salinas remarked early in the sexenio that the PRI would have 
to become used to being a competitive party of individuals rather than the mass 
party of government, but attempts to loosen the corporatist ties proved as difficult 
in the late 1980s as they had been in the 1960s. The problems still centred on the 
tensions between the regions and the centre, the balance of power between the 
different sectors of the party and finally between the modernisers represented by 
the bureaucratic-technical class and the so-called politicos or traditionalists. The 
balance of power between the regions and the centre has always been under 
negotiation, with regional bosses winning benefits from the centre, but on major 
policy decisions the centre generally prevails. In keeping with this, Salinas and 
his cohorts instigated the reform process in 1988. Yet there was continual 
negotiation, resulting in a see-saw effect of reform followed by U-turns. 
Although Salinas was able to use sanctions against recalcitrant party members, 
such as the use of interim governorships to remove 'obstacles', the tight rein on 
PRONASOL resources and the control over economic reform, the traditionalists 
were also able to win concessions. Party reform in particular was an arena which 
allowed for a certain amount of negotiation where the different factions within 
the party jockeyed for position. However, instead of the previous practice of 
tinkering at the margins to coopt the new 'natural' leaders who had arrived on the 
scene with such force in the 1980s, the whole question of the PRI's future was 
raised. Given the rhetoric regarding the need to democratise, to take into account 
the demands of the grassroots and to be a party of individuals rather than groups, 
the party was being asked to shed its corporatist identity. But the question was 
then: could the PRI survive as a party in a competing pluralist system? Many 
observers thought not (Meyer, 1989). 
As Morris correctly identifies, any party reform which was going to promote 
pluralism, as indicated by Salinas, was going to be predicated on the notion of 
decentralisation and the weakening of the traditional sectors. However, such a 
decentralisation masks a tendency towards the strengthening of central powers 
since any in-coming leaders would be more strongly associated with the president 
(Morris, 1992). Whatever the type of reform, since the PRI is not a 
homogeneous entity, any change would have to be navigated through the choppy 
waters where different interests competed: the reformers, the dinosaurs in the 
corporate sectors, the technocrats in charge of macroeconomic policy and the 
alchemists responsible for elections (Fox, 1994). As time progressed, we could 
identify a shifting of emphasis away from the party, but without its complete 
abandonment. 
It was easy to decide that the PRI's brand of corporatism was not functioning 
efficiently, but quite another to know what part of the structure needed to be 
addressed first. Given the economic changes that had been underway since 1982, 
but which were to be intensified with Salinas as president, there was the obvious 
need to look at labour relations. Mexico was going to need a flexible labour force 
to confront the demands of the global economy in the 1990s and beyond. To 
achieve this was going to need a massive increase in productivity and the 
privatisation and/or closure of many state companies where the CTM and other 
PRI affiliated unions had their power bases. Salinas gave a clear warning signal 
at the outset of his administration against potential obstructionist strategies on the 
part of the CTM's long-time leader, Fidel Velazquez, by ousting two other 
powerful union bosses, Joaquin Garcia Hernandez (La Quina) of the petrol 
workers and Carlos Jonguitud Barrios of the enormous teaching union, the 
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Education (SNTE). Velazquez did little 
to stall the neo-liberal project through the rest of the sexenio, but he opposed the 
'modernisation' of the party; the CTM generally is antagonistic to the 
dismemberment of corporatism.17 Equally, the countryside also required reform 
since Mexico needed to become much more efficient in food production, 
especially if NAFTA was to be signed (Appendini, 1994). This reformist 
tendency in the agricultural sector is best exemplified by the changes to article 
27 of the Constitution regarding the ejidos and land tenure. Consequently, to push 
through rural change, the CNC would also be a focus of reformers' attention. 
The CNC had been under attack from independent organisations responding to 
significant discontent in certain predominantly rural states in the south-west 
(Harvey, 1990) and the west. However, despite these two pressing needs, it was 
in fact the CNOP which was most affected by the 'democratisation' measures. 
The CNOP was chosen over the other two sectors for three major reasons: first, 
the PRI was worried by the degree of middle class discontent (the CNOP had 
been founded to absorb the middle classes into the party in the 1940s); secondly, 
the sector had failed to coopt the alienated groups emerging in the poor 
neighbourhoods under its remit, and finally, the sector was considered more 
docile and therefore easier to reform. 
Transforming the Popular Sector 
Although there was a clear decision to restructure the Popular Sector, the 
reorganisation was mismanaged from the start. The middle classes had played a 
key role in the electoral shock of 1988, and needed to be won over by economic 
reform, although their support could never be guaranteed. Salinas himself 
identified the colonias populares, women and young people as the areas which 
were causing the greatest problems. These were the people and geographical 
spaces which had given birth to dynamic movimientos urbanos populares (MUPs) 
a key element of the opposition to the PRI during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
reform of the Popular Sector consisted of four stages. It began with a traditional 
attempt to adjust things at the margins. This was followed by a more radical 
reform which was then extended in a third stage. 
However, before this could really take off, the traditionalists had begun to 
fight against the changes and a massive U-turn took place. While these changes 
were occurring, PRONASOL was also being developed. Despite it being strongly 
identified with the Salinas presidency, we must remember that programmes such 
as this have existed for some time (Fox, 1994) and that there are plenty of 
examples of similar projects in other countries (Graham, 1994). Nevertheless, it 
was perceived as a new project and it was finding its feet at the time of the first 
changes in the Popular Sector. By the time of the retreat, it was firmly 
established and had become a key electoral resource. 
In the first stages of reform, it was thought that it was possible simply to bring 
urban popular movements into the fold by revitalising the PRI's neighbourhood 
organisation network which was affiliated to the CNOP; thus, a national assembly 
for residents' committees was established. Soon this was not considered a radical 
enough plan and in 1990 a new, more ambitious project emerged. However, this 
clearly showed the difference in approach of the modernisers and the 
traditionalists, or dinosaurs as they are popularly known. The former saw the 
reorganisation as the opportunity genuinely to modernise the PRI and make it 
more accountable, albeit within the constraints of keeping the party as the 'party 
in government'. The other faction wanted to strengthen the corporate structures 
and to return to favour trading, which had been undermined by the economic 
crisis and the rise of independent organisations.18 Between 1990 and 1992 it 
appeared that the modernisers were gaining the upper hand. However, there was 
a U-turn in mid-1992 and by 1993 the 'dinosaurs' were in ascendency. 
The return of the traditionalists coincided with a down-turn in the economy 
and the pressures resulting from the NAFTA negotiations, as well as a retreat on 
the part of the opposition making 'voluntary' political reform an indulgence. The 
fact that the PRI needed to be reformed regardless of the pressure from outside 
was ignored. Whilst it seemed to be accepted that genuine electoral competition 
will one day be a reality in Mexico, and that the PRI will find it difficult to 
function in a system where parties do not receive funding from the state,19 there 
seemed little commitment to reform unless it is unavoidable. It clearly showed 
the PRI and the political system to be reactive rather than proactive and as such 
trailing civil society, which was embracing its own idea of modernity (Luis Javier 
Garrido, La Jornada, 10 January 1992). The longer the party fails to take the 
lead in political change, the more likely it is to disappear once a pluralistic 
system is in place. Below we will discuss the changes and how they demonstrate 
the failure to seize the opportunity for far-reaching reform. 
The CNOP prior to 1988 had developed in a chaotic manner and had never 
been designed to deal with 'popular' organisations, despite its name. The aim of 
the Confederation was to bring the middle classes into the priista fold during the 
1940s and the colonos y comerciantes (residents of the low-income 
neighbourhoods and smalltraders) were only included later, and then only 
included in the CNOP because there was no other suitable organisation. Indeed, 
as the Confederation developed over the years it became a catch-all sector 
incorporating those organisations and groups which emerged; when the banks 
were nationalised, the employees became members of the CNOP (although there 
was a fight with the CTM over who would take in the new members). Unlike its 
two counterparts, the CNOP did not have clear limits to its constituency and thus 
forging links with the different branches was more difficult. Despite this, it was 
the most influential sector and the one which had the greatest number of seats in 
Congress, frequently having higher representation than the other two sectors 
combined (Bailey, 1988), as a result, in part, of its class composition. Figure 1 
shows how the CNOP looked in 1988 after 45 years of existence. There was no 
coordination between the bureaucratic branches and the participatory groups. 
Also there was inequality in the organisational capabilities of the different 
subsections: the union and professional organisations were much more established 
and self-sufficient, capable of standing alone without party support, whilst the 
neighbourhood organisations depended to a large extent on party organisers and 
local leaders. They lacked the dynamism displayed by the independent 
organisations and were failing to attract new members. In addition, there were 
too many groups within both the participatory and the bureaucratic structures 
which reinforced the vertical, hierarchical ordering, keeping potential allies 
separate. 
The Modernisation: Phase I 
The reorganisation of the CNOP was not intended in the first instance to be a 
complete overhaul, perhaps because of the need to address the problems within 
the CTM and CNC. With colonias populares clearly identified as an area of 
weakness for the PRI, the first change for the CNOP was the development of a 
national organisation for the residents' committees.20 The first national assembly 
was held in Acapulco in April 1989, and reflected the organisation of the 
independent movements which had held national meetings (encuentros) during the 
1980s. The Coordinadora Nacional de los Movimientos Urbanos Populares 
(CONAMUP) was a successful umbrella organisation which had been a major 
player in the opposition to the PRI as one of the three Coordinadoras .2l These 
independent organisations had shown the possibilities of grassroots participation 
in community politics and how they had become a threat to the political system 
by organising on a national scale. The PRI wanted to be able to capture this 
effervescence of political activity by replicating similar structures 
The advantage of refusing to overhaul the party completely is that it has 
avoided confronting directly the corruption endemic in the system through 
clientelism. The PRI 'MOTS' could be activated selectively depending on the 
needs of a given community and traditional leaders need not be touched unless 
they were problematic. A further advantage was that, by copying the self-help 
tactics of the MUPs, it could claim to be open to popular participation and save 
money by promoting schemes based on partnership with the community 
contributing between 20-50% of project resources; PRONASOL developed this 
'participatory' method further. 
Figure 1 





The Popular Sector Reform Project 1990 
The new PRI Assembly for the residents' committees met again in Oaxtepec 
in September 1989. However, it was soon realised that it was not possible just 
to graft another new organisation onto the sector and that more radical surgery 
was needed. 
Phase II: the emergence of Une 
The second set of changes was to counter the disequilibrium between the 
bureaucracy and the participants. Part of the problem now identified was the lack 
of balance between those branches dedicated to the bureaucracy of the CNOP and 
those dedicated to actual mass participation. It was decided that technical support 
should take a secondary role to the organisations 'on the ground'. Furthermore, 
it was decided to concentrate on streamlining the participatory branches by 
grouping together like organisations to allow for better coordination between the 
groups, but still keeping key groups separate. The pilot scheme is illustrated in 
Figure 2; the bureaucratic branches have been reduced to twelve secretariats and 
the participatory branches are clearly separated into four groups: popular 
organisations to include grassroots groups; social organisations for traditional 
white collar unions such as teachers and government workers; professional and 
technical for lawyers, accountants and engineers; and new social movements to 
bring in ecologists, pacifists and humanists. It was at this point, 1990, that the 
idea surfaced that there should be a branch dedicated to 'new social movements' 
(NSM). 
This gives an indication of the reactive nature of the PRI hierarchy. It is very 
quick to appropriate fashionable terminology and discourse; in the late 1980s 
there was a burst of literature comparing the surge of popular protest in Latin 
America with the new social movements which had emerged in Western Europe 
during the 1970s. This comparison has since been criticised for importing the 
experience of one region and trying to transplant it into the distinct experiences 
of another.22 The different groups which the PRI saw as NSMs were diverse; 
some were indeed new actors to the Mexican political scene but others had a 
history of participation, albeit not necessarily high profile. Thus, NSMs included 
ecology groups, pacifists, humanists, women, youth and senior citizens' groups, 
but not the neighbourhood organisations which for some reason were not 
considered 'citizens' groups'. 
The development of NSMs allowed for the separation of neighbourhood 
organisations from youth, environmental groups and women; that is, using the 
old tactics of separating potential allies. At the same time, however, it 
demonstrated a lack of conceptual clarity about NSMs and citizenship which led 
to more U-turns during the reorganisations; for example, when asked what was 
new about these groups, the reply was that they really were not sure and were 
thinking of changing the name!23 The pilot scheme never materialised; in 1991 
Une - Ciudadanos en Movimiento was launched. Une never meant anything, but 
was derived from the idea of unirse, and the slogan was 'Citizens on the Move' 
- again, trying to use the fashionable discourse of citizenship. As we can see 
from Figure 3, the support organisations were reduced to four and the 
participatory branches to five: public sector unions (including the SNTE), 
professional associations, technical-bureaucratic groups, urban movements and 
citizens' associations (the original NSMs). 
The design in Figure 3 reflects the organisational structures of the MUPs, and 
as such enjoyed the support of some progressive members of the party, 
particularly at national level. Since the party had lost support in the low-income 
neighbourhoods and much of the organised opposition had emerged when 
previously non-engaged actors became involved in collective action to demand 
basic services from the government, the party needed to have a clearer strategy 
in the neighbourhoods and needed to be perceived as effective in dealing with 
these issues. It was apparent that the 'natural' link between the PRI and the 
government, expressed through access to service provision, was weakening and 
some independent organisations had been able to play off different branches of 
government against one another, frequently using national government as a 
resource against local PRI bosses and thus gain benefits (Foweraker, 1990b), 
consequently exacerbating the tensions between the centre and the regions. Whilst 
this has been effective in winning certain demands, it has also strengthened the 
system's further centralisation with local issues increasingly being taken to the 
centre to be resolved (cf Eckstein 1990). There has been much interplay between 
centralisation and decentralisation. The modernisation project often involved local 
decentralisation whereby community involvement, which developed local service 
projects, was encouraged since it was cost effective, but real power was rarely 
devolved. The need to address the efficiency of service distribution in the 
'problem areas' reinforced the presence of a new decentralised PRI in certain 
situations, but this is decentralisation from the top which served to reinforce 
central power. 
Although these measures were designed more to maintain political stability 
than to improve the living standards of the poor, there were positive benefits for 
many, particularly in the battle for power at the local level. In 1990 there was no 
national record of the level of service provision in the country's major urban 
centres, so the team at the Une headquarters set about compiling such a register. 
This proved to be invaluable to a president who needed to illustrate that the 
system could respond more rapidly to demands. There have been many anecdotes 
telling of the President belittling local officials by promising the installation of 
a given service that a local community had been soliciting for some time. Since 
he had been forearmed with information about services, these were rarely 
spontaneous decisions. Frequently, the service is made under the auspices of 
PRONASOL, leading to tensions between PRONASOL and the Popular Sector 
Figure 3 
Une: The Popular Sector in 1991 
(see below). Consequently, the restructuring of the Popular Sector gave the 
President weapons with which to oust local priistas who were not so sympathetic 
to the idea of change. Although there were obvious benefits to the poor, it still 
left service distribution a highly arbitrary and discretionary process. 
The revamping of the Popular Sector led to another related project: the 
Movimiento Popular Urbano Territorial (MT) with its roots in the first phase of 
changes. The attack on corporatism by the modernisers was in part due to the fact 
that the vertical structures it embraces were coming under attack from the new 
horizontal organisations of popular protest. The plan of the MT was again to 
emulate these horizontal practices focusing on the community rather than the 
workplace. At first it appeared that this would be a branch of the new Popular 
Sector, taking over the urban movements branch. However, there was an 
offensive on the part of the 'dinosaurs' within the Popular Sector who saw the 
structure of the MT as a threat to their empires since it was aimed at new 
leaders, and some began a stalling project. Many had already had to deal with the 
erosion of their status through the high profile of PRONASOL, which had done 
much to undermine their positions, and the emergence of another new 
organisation directed from Mexico City would further their decline. The battle 
between those demanding a reinforcement of traditional corporatism and those 
trying to push the PRI into a more competitive party deepened. 
Phase III: The Emergence of the Movimiento Popular Urbano 
Territorial (MT) 
Although much of the rhetoric claimed that the goal of party reform was to make 
the PRI an actor in a competitive multi-party system, the reform of the PRI was 
still based, in the short-term at least, on sectors. The modernisers within the 
party were active in the founding of a new 'social support' for the PRI. Arq. Jose 
Parcero Lopez, a key figure in the formulation of Une, was requested to develop 
a new model of collective action whilst Genaro Borrego was president of the 
PRI. The overall plan was to have three social supports (ie sectors): the re-
vamped Popular Sector (FNOC); a combined CTM-CNC Worker-Peasant Pact 
and the new territorial organisation designed to undermine the MUPs; the 
Movimiento Popular Urbano Territorial (MT): see Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
Proposed Corporate Structure, 1992 
The 'new' Popular Sector would be called the Frente Nacional de 
Organizations y Ciudadanos (FNOC) and in effect would return it to the old 
CNOP with a more streamlined bureaucracy included in each sub-sector (Figure 
5). With this project the separation of the urban movements in the MT from the 
'citizens' and professional associations in FNOC would be institutionalised. The 
fate of the MT gives a good indication of the lack of real commitment to the 
'modernisation and democratisation' project and the degree of clarity of what the 
reform package entailed. Jose Parcero's goal was to develop a horizontal 
organisation that would be linked to the PRI in the neighbourhoods and whose 
raison d'etre would be gestion social. In effect, he copied the forms of 
organisation that had proved so successful for the 1980s independent 
organisations; i.e. networking, community-based organisations, mobilisation 
around consumption issues (something that was also happening within 
PRONASOL.) The focus was the space of the neighbourhood which would be 
independent of traditional sectoral affiliation. Activists would invite people 'house 
by house to encourage the participation of those who were not in the party' 
(Movimiento Territorial nd, p. 2).24 The National Urban Movement, which had 
formed part of the ill-fated Une, was seen as an important beginning and the MT 
was to continue its work but with a stronger, separate identity. However, there 
was an anomaly when the already established residents' committees were left in 
FNOC rather than forming the bedrock of the MT. 
Figure 5 
The Structure of the FNOC from 1993 
In the Movement's planning documents there is much emphasis on respecting the 
autonomy of the groups, of incorporating 'natural' leaders and of taking into 
account the increasing complexity of Mexican urban society. By doing this it was 
hoped that flexible structure with links to non-governmental organisations active 
in the community would be developed. These ideas can be best summed up by 
the following quote: 
identification con los propositos del pueblo; arraigo en las nuevas organizations, 
apertura y aceptacion, incorporation total en los lfderes naturales: continuidad de 
un quehacer cotidiano que se gana con participation y esfiierzo el reconocimiento 
de la comunidad: imagination para promover y abrir caminos que eliminen el 
burocratismo y, con gran conviction y compromiso, terminen de una vez con viejos 
esquemas de manipulation y de clientelismo tradicional {Ibid, p. 10). 
However, there were some anomalies from the outset; Parcero wanted any group 
active in the neighbourhoods dealing with issues of service provision to organise 
within the MT in order to create a greater pressure block, regardless of party 
affiliation. But the MT would remain affiliated to the PRI and be a party organ 
as illustrated by the above quote 'going house to house', although the constituent 
groups of the MT could vote themselves out of the organisation at a future date.25 
Jose Parcero Lopez did not see this approach as problematic despite the fact that 
the PRD never recognised the Salinas administration as legitimate, and thus PRD 
groups in the neighbourhoods would necessarily be against any affiliation with 
MT. Another anomaly lay in the fact that such a community-oriented organisation 
would be an obvious candidate for incorporating residents' committees, but these 
remained part of FNOC.26 The Solidarity committees would also be expected to 
join the MT since their remit was gestion social which would formalise the links 
between party and PRONASOL. 
The goal of Parcero Lopez, to break away from the vertical structures central 
to corporatism and establish a collegiate system with horizontal linkages, was a 
radical plan in the Mexican context. He was also insistent upon the idea of 
electoral posts for all, including the General Secretary, although he would hold 
the position in the first instance in an attempt to avoid the dedazo. However, with 
the PRI's XIV National Assembly traditional corporatism was revived with Une 
becoming the 'new' FNOC, reconfirming the original political structures of the 
Popular Sector. As a result, it was clear that the fate of a radical new plan of the 
MT was almost certainly doomed. In the event, the organisation was launched in 
1992, but it immediately had to battle with the traditionalists within the party who 
saw it as another area for furthering clientelistic relations. 
MT on the Ground27 
It was evident that during the 1970s and 1980s the groups emerging 'organically' 
from civil society were those based on spatial identification rather than a class-
based identity, that they were concerned with gestion social and are therefore the 
groups targeted by the MT. (See Appendix A for a description of the structure 
of MT). Parcero argues that the central idea has been to open spaces for 
collective action within the party. There are two levels: civil society and political 
society. The first consists of closed, vertical structures, whilst those in the second 
structures are more flexible and are not affiliated to political parties. The 
traditional leaders have been displaced by independent activity and thus a new 
organisation was necessary. As such, they needed to renovate the structures and 
cadres: there had been more debate than management. Parcero believes that there 
cannot be a separation of the political and social; in order to deal with the social 
issues there needs to be participation in political questions. The idea was to let 
the communities decide their own forms of political organisation where the party 
chiefs would not interfere. By January 1993 there were 10,000 comites de base; 
it was formally launched on 14 February 1993. 
Thus, the arrival of MT represented another priista organisation active in the 
neighbourhoods. First, there are the sessional organisations which are the party's 
basic units mobilising specifically around electoral issues; then there are the 
residents' committees which remain part of the FNOC despite the idea of 
separating the territorial organisations from the professional associations, unions 
and 'citizens' organisations', and finally the MT, which repeats the remit of the 
FNOC in the neighbourhoods. Add to this the presence of PRONASOL which 
cannot be totally separated from the PRI, particularly if linked to the MT, and 
there is confusion regarding who is responsible for what on the ground, leading 
to competition amongst priistas and a saturation of organisations.28 
Furthermore, the MT not only failed to break down the old structures and 
replace them with a less vertical form, but it also failed to keep its own rules 
regarding elections: Parcero was replaced as the leader soon after the 
inauguration of the MT on 14 February 1993 by Carlos Sobrino. This was widely 
interpreted as giving Sobrino a launching pad in his bid to become Governor of 
Yucatan.29 Parcero then became Adjunct Secretary General of the PRI along with 
Fernando Ortiz Arana who replaced Genaro Borrego when he failed to survive 
the series of party reorganisations. 
To add insult to injury for those who have been attempting to pressure for 
democratisation from within, during the National Assembly of FNOC in June 
1993, the old cadres were re-established in prominent positions and as one 
regional official in Guadalajara told me 'los dinasaurios estamos ganando'. The 
tensions which have been evident through this series of 'reforms' have frequently 
come from middle-ranking officials in the regions. Their futures are more secure 
within the traditional corporatist sectors, within a system they know; 
consequently, they have mobilised against the reorganisation. At present they 
appear to be gaining ground, but undeterred the modernisers have continued with 
projects, not least trying to undermine any independent urban organisation 
through grassroots mobilisations. In the following section, one such project will 
be analysed. 
Sociedad Urbana 
Since the PRI had identified urban Mexico as an arena of support for the 
opposition, it launched an offensive to reassert its own position. However, given 
the reactive nature of the political system, there was a time lapse between the 
identification of the problem in July 1988, and the response: the programme 
Sociedad Urbana, launched on 24 June 1993. This is a PRI offensive with the 
coordination coming from the same office which created the MT and with 
Parcero Lopez in his new position of Adjunct General Secretary leading the way 
and trying to continue with his reforms from a different base. This project was 
aimed at the main urban areas, the largest 150 cities which account for 47.7% of 
the population, with the idea of establishing the party's base for the 21st century; 
i.e. in areas where the PRI had lost out to both left and right in 1988. It was to 
represent the 'new polities' of the PRI again with horizontal organisations, aimed 
at citizens' concerns with micro-level agreements, personalised dealings and 
based on territorial units (Programa Estrategico: Sociedad Urbana, June 1993).30 
From the documents published by the party, the role of Sociedad Urbana is very 
much linked to the style of MT with attempts to forge ties between the party and 
the emergent grassroots organisations. This is done through a mixture of hi-tech 
programmes, such as a telephone hotline, old-fashioned meeting the people 
schemes and, although not stated explicitly, the idea of coopting them into the 
priista fold. The party is to 
(buscar) entrar en contacto con los diversos movimientos sociales, redes, grupos y 
otras nuevasformas de organization permitiendo esto la vinculacion, la circulation 
de ideas, objetivos, experiencias etc, dentro de un espacio de respeto a las 
diferencias pero con la busqueda permanente de coincidencias para fundamentar 
proyectos comunes.Esto le permitira al PRI fortalecer y profundizar su rol de 
Promotor Social. (Programa Estrategico, 1993, emphasis in the original) 
Thus, we see quite clearly that the project of the PRI in urban areas is designed 
to incorporate the independent organisations of the previous two decades, but is 
doing little to strike out with a genuinely original approach to opposition in the 
cities, and the independent organisations themselves have since changed their 
focus to electoral mobilisation. We can say in a positive vein that at least this 
represents a continuation of a project linking the emergence of MT with a party-
wide strategy in urban areas, unlike the disjointed political reforms seen in other 
arenas, and that it complements PRONASOL. However, there is a lack of 
political initiative which is in contrast with the audacious economic project which 
Salinas launched when putting forward the idea of NAFTA. 
By establishing projects such as MT and the Sociedad Urbana, the PRI is 
trying to forge a new relationship with social groups, but whilst it is also 
reinforcing the traditional structures, apparent in the XVI National Assembly in 
1993, it is indicating that it is not confident that it can succeed on this front alone 
and that there is a risk involved in dismantling corporatism. The shifts which 
have occurred in the attempt to reorganise just the Popular Sector of the PRI give 
a clear indication that no-one has the upper hand in forcing through change in a 
certain direction. Despite the fact that a number at the top wanted a radical 
overhaul, even they appeared unable to imagine the PRI as a genuinely competing 
party - hence their idea of reorganisation still emphasised sectoral affiliation. The 
idea of establishing a series of neighbourhood organisations, which could have 
members of the opposition forming the basis of the PRI's grassroots structures, 
reflected the inability to let go of the cooptation and clientelism whilst grasping 
at the independent social movements way of 'doing polities'. Equally, there are 
many elite priistas who are not at all keen to dismantle traditional corporatism 
and see little need with the relaxation of opposition pressures, particularly from 
the MUPs, to carry out such drastic change. Since the president was distracted 
with the economy and appeared to be lacking a clear idea of how he saw the 
future PRI, the reforms stagnated. This lack of clear direction from the top might 
have changed if Colosio had been elected as president. However, President 
Zedillo, an economist with little history in the party and limited personal 
charisma, will find modernising the PRI as difficult as Salinas. 
PRONASOL: a corporatist project? 
Poverty alleviation and welfare projects are not new in Mexico and they have 
changed as sexenios have changed in the Mexican tradition. The developers of 
PRONASOL learnt from previous programmes such as COPLAMAR 
(Coordination General del Plan de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados), 
PIDER (Programa Integral para el Desarrollo Rural) and SAM (Sistema 
Alimentario Mexicano) (Knight, 1994; Fox , 1993 and Craske, 1993), but it was 
new in that it had benefited from a careful examination of the successes behind 
the independent Coordinadoras of the 1980s.31 Although every president has his 
pet project, Salinas kept a particularly tight rein on the development of 
PRONASOL; for the first three years, whilst nominally part of the Secretaria de 
Programacion y Presupuesto, it was run from the presidential office before 
becoming the central policy of SEDESOL (Secretaria de Desarrollo Social), one 
of the two 'super ministries' set up by Salinas (the other being Finance). There 
is no doubt about the effectiveness of the programme in electoral terms, although 
whether it constituted a reinforcement of clientelism or a case of 'pork barrel' 
politics remains a moot point (Molinar and Weldon, 1994). In many ways it is 
possible to argue that PRONASOL represented a democratic opening since there 
was the hint of horizontal linkages, access for the opposition and popular 
participation in decision-making. However, it is my contention that the structure 
of PRONASOL reflects the vertical, functionally differentiated groups identified 
by Schmitter (see above), but with the concentration of corporatist structures at 
the lower and intermediate stages. This concentration reinforces the trend of top 
politicians emerging through ranks other than the party whilst mass demand-
making is controlled through these structures at the local level. The main vertical 
structures are services, production and regional, with other projects including the 
Escuela Digna and Mujeres en Solidaridad. They are concentrated in low-income 
rural and urban areas and the different activities are quite separate. The targeted 
groups reflect those groups which Salinas identified as problem areas in 1988; 
women, colonos and youth, with added attention to rural areas which will 
experience sharp social dislocation in the coming years. 
Within the rubric of services, where most of the urban projects take place, the 
modernisation of resource provision represents a way of making Mexico's 
'inclusionary' corporatism more cost-effective by introducing the notion of 'co-
responsibility', requiring that the recipients contribute between 25-50% of the 
cost of a project before it goes ahead. This has the effect of involving the 
community, aping the self-help projects so successful in the independent sector, 
and cutting costs for the government whereby the state no longer shoulders the 
burden of the total social, or even infrastructural, costs. It is also a part of the 
new rhetoric surrounding citizenship where a good citizen is one who is shows 
'solidaridad' with her/his neighbours and a bad one rejects this; obviously it is 
difficult to be against activities which improve the community's standard of 
living, making opposition movements wary in their criticisms of solidaridad 
(Peterson, 1991). 
The emergence of PRONASOL does not represent a shift towards neo-
corporatism since this would imply an influential position regarding policy-
making for the groups incorporated into state structures. However, it does allow 
for a return to some kind of social contract between the state and the masses, 
albeit within the bounds of co-responsibility. The role of PRONASOL is to 
maintain social peace during the period of social dislocation resulting from the 
economic project. The shifting of corporatism from the party to the state is an 
indication of the decreased role for the PRI in the future when it will be confined 
to more general electoral questions; it has already been observed that 
PRONASOL is overshadowing the PRI (Morris, 1992). What is important in this 
transitional phase is that in many areas the PRI and PRONASOL are seen as the 
same thing and the success of PRONASOL results in votes for the party whose 
strength is still needed at this point. As such, the project represents a 
modernisation of state corporatism.32 
There is much debate about the role of PRONASOL in the current period of 
radical reform,33 and certainly it is difficult to discern a clear unilinear trend, 
particularly in a country with so many regional variations. Although it is too 
early as yet to analyse the impact of PRONASOL on the 1994 election results, 
much of the earlier discussion focused on making the PRI a more viable electoral 
option in 1994 and beyond through judicious use of PRONASOL (certainly the 
1991 mid-term elections were testimony to its effectiveness as a campaign 
weapon). The key to the reform of the PRI being linked to the emergence of 
PRONASOL is the nature of the relationship between the participants and the 
programme and the way in which it reconfigures centre-periphery relations, 
reinforcing centralism and the strength of the president without increasing the 
power of the party per se. Bailey stresses the way in which PRONASOL 
represents a deconcentration of power rather than decentralisation (1994), thus 
allowing for the reduction of bottlenecks and obstructionist tactics at the local 
level, but without devolving power. It also allows for a fair degree of local 
participation in the decision-making process regarding the choice of project, but 
there is always a strong hand from central authorities and the parallel 
bureaucracy which has emerged to challenge the old federalist structures. 
The rise of SEDESOL and its importance vis-a-vis other ministries reinforces 
the role of PRONASOL as the new terrain of corporatism since it indicates its 
possible long-term existence - although this institutionalisation may jeopardise its 
ability to respond in a flexible way (Knight, 1994). However, what it loses in 
flexibility it may gain from ceasing to be so personalistic and arbitrary. At 
present it frequently reinforces caudillo tendencies and certainly reinforced the 
'ultimate' caudillo, Salinas himself. Although PRONASOL has had many 
successes in terms of channelling services to many needy communities, albeit not 
the poorest as many writers attest (Molinar and Weldon ,1994; Bailey, 1994), 
there are also new problems and contradictions. There are increased tensions 
between the centre and the regions within the PRI, leading at times to priista 
involvement in anti-system behaviour (Morris, 1992), and there are also tensions 
within the different branches of PRONASOL itself. One of the strengths of the 
Programme has been its ability to absorb activists from many quarters, including 
long-standing opposition activists on the one hand, who want to combat poverty, 
and technocrats on the other, who want to see more efficient distribution of 
government services. This has led to problems between some who work 'on the 
ground' and those who administer the funds, as will be shown below (cf Bailey, 
1994). 
Politics in the Regions: 
Guadalajarafs low-income neighbourhoods 
Most of the reforms outlined above came from the centre and to a large degree 
from Salinas himself. However, the lack of consistency was a result of pressures 
from the regions where party members were not happy with what they saw as an 
attempt to undermine their authority and to end the traditional security of a party 
future. An added element of insecurity for them came from the emergence of 
PRONASOL. In many instances the activities of PRONASOL were in direct 
competition with those of both the on-going FNOC and the MT. The increased 
tensions evident in this sexenio were often expressed by local leaders who felt 
they were being sacrificed on the altar of democratisation and modernisation. 
Many of them are at best lukewarm about some of the basic tenets of the 
administration, particularly NAFTA and party reforms. It appeared to be the case 
that the democratisation which can be detected in the shape of accountability of 
leaders took place at the local level whilst concomitantly there was a 
strengthening of authoritarianism at the national level (Eckstein, 1990). They 
were suffering the effects of the 'deconcentration'. Increased centralism over the 
past six years is evident at several levels, such as the tight control over 
PRONASOL funding by Salinas over the first few years, in particular with little 
accountability over spending (Dresser, 1991), the massive rise in the number of 
interim governors and the increasing imposition of 'unity' candidates for electoral 
positions despite the rhetoric of democratisation. Sometimes called Solidarity 
candidates, this latter group was one of the issues most complained about in 
discussions with grassroots party members (see below). At present, local and 
regional party activists will only criticise central party policies in a veiled way, 
but as we shall see, their interpretation that the traditionalists were gaining the 
initiative and stalling the more radical party reforms has given the confidence for 
some to be more outspoken in their opposition to reform. 
The tensions between regional and national authorities is well illustrated by the 
case of Guadalajara in the state of Jalisco. As Mexico's second city, which is fast 
losing its position to the northern city of Monterrey, there is much rivalry with 
both Monterrey and Mexico City. Jalisco is a conservative state which has strong 
links to traditional Catholicism and is home to the prominent panista family 
Gonzalez Luna (in 1988 seven out of eight districts in Guadalajara fell to the 
PAN, but the state at large remained priista). However, generally the local PAN 
has not been as dynamic as in the northern states, particularly Chihuahua. The 
local PRI politicians are generally of the traditionalist school and there was 
rumoured to be a lack of sympathy between Salinas and the state governor, 
Guillermo Cosio Vidaurri. Despite this, it has not been a problem state in many 
ways and the popular protests seen in other cities were not so prominent in 
Guadalajara. 
The past two years have seen two important events which, whilst not political 
in themselves, had serious repercussions for the PRI. The first was the gas 
pipeline explosions of 22 April 1992, which resulted in the deaths of thousands 
and the homelessness of many more. Popular protest criticising the relief effort 
led to the resignation of Cosio and the municipal president, Enrique Dau Flores.34 
The event led to a deepening of the involvement of PRONASOL in the city as 
well as subsequent tensions between its regional and federal branches (see 
below). 
The second event was the assassination of the city's Cardinal, Juan Jesus 
Posada Ocampo, by supposed drug barons at the airport when he was 'mistaken' 
for a drug trafficker. Although there were many rumours about the involvement 
of political figures and links between politicians and drugs gangs, what was more 
damaging was that nobody believed the truth about his death would ever be 
discovered. This was a reflection of the absence of due process where an 
investigation would be carried out to the end no matter what the consequences.35 
As a result of these two incidents, the local PRI felt itself to be under seige, 
and, in the aftermath, local priistas felt that they had been abandoned by Mexico 
City. Salinas arrived in the city shortly after the explosions in 1992 and 
undermined the authority of regional and local bodies; a few days later Cosio 
asked for indefinite leave of absence (licencia). Many saw this episode as another 
case of the centre stamping its authority on local events and displacing perceived 
'dinosaurs'. Certainly it appeared that this was an excuse to get rid of Cosio who 
was antipathetic towards Salinas and reform, and at the same time have a 
convenient scapegoat to take away pressure from the state oil monopoly, Pemex, 
which was responsible for the leak that caused the explosion. Popular outrage at 
both the circumstances of the explosions and the relief operation resulted in the 
authorities, and thereby the PRI itself, being put in the spotlight. Consequently, 
two Mexico City priistas commented that they were not confident that the PRI 
could win a gubernatorial race if one were to be called at the time (June 1993). 
It has been events like these which succeeded in pushing the citizens of 
Guadalajara onto the streets to protest at the authorities' actions rather than other 
issues. Local priistas complained that opposition parties took advantage of these 
events for 'proseletismo partidario', which indicated the feelings of vulnerability 
within the party. It is also an indication that, although the party improved 
nationally in the mid-term elections and Salinas himself enjoyed personal 
popularity, the PRI remained weak and that random events could seriously 
damage its standing. 
Given that the Jalisco PRI was perceived by the centre to be resistant to reform 
and modernisation, the tensions between the two have continued, although with 
a slightly different emphasis now that the reformers are on the defensive. The 
local officials acknowledge that the party needs to change and that the 1988 
elections did demonstrate that it had been seriously weakened. However, there 
was an objection to the way in which the reform had been handled. Ironically, 
their criticism stemmed from the lack of democracy regarding the direction and 
style of reform. They felt that they and their interests were being sacrificed 
without due attention being paid to their own views. Frequently, there was a 
defence of class positions where it was argued that those who were losing out in 
this series of reform were the middle classes; the rich were to benefit from 
economic changes and the poor had PRONASOL, but the lower middle classes 
had no access to compensatory mechanisms. 
Eduardo Rodriguez, General Secretary of the FNOC in Jalisco, believes that 
there has been a resurgence of corporatism due to the costs involved in turning 
the PRI into a party of individuals. Also, he believes that the changes so far have 
brought a reaction from local leaders who are not against the changes in 
principle, but who feel pushed aside by the process. Although Rodriguez says that 
many are receptive to change, his own comments show little in the way of 
progressive thought. He is not impressed with Salinas's decision to 'give away' 
elections. Instead, he believes that the party 'debe endurecerse mas' and sees the 
democratisation programmes against the best interests of the PRI. There is a 
belief amongst many local PRI leaders that people do not want to know about 
electoral politics, being more concerned about material well-being, and are happy 
being told for whom to vote. This was clearly not the case for the millions who 
voted for the FDN in 1988, but it might be the case for members of the PRI 
itself. There is a perception that there is a lot to fight for in terms of party 
reforms and that nothing is settled, while Rodriguez was obviously pleased that 
the traditionalists had come out of the National Assembly in June 1993 on top.36 
Although he stated that he wanted change, his suggestions were that the party 
should revamp the old system rather than pursue the reformist path politically and 
neo-liberal policies economically. The loss of support for the PRI was explained 
as being due to the natural exhaustion of militants in a party which has been in 
power so long. The party realised that the base was becoming alienated from the 
elite and the success of Cardenas, the leader of the FDN and later the PRD, 
prompted the leadership to address this problem. 
With regard to PRONASOL, there are two major issues for local party 
activists; first, the programme is moving into service provision, which was an 
important element in the clientelistic system operated by the PRI; secondly, and 
related to this, PRONASOL has been a weapon for the modernisers in 
undermining the traditionalists. Given the degree of funding for PRONASOL, 
there is a lot of tension between the PRI and members of PRONASOL. 
Obviously in practice it is not always easy to separate PRONASOL from the PRI, 
nor indeed is the electorate supposed to. The blurring of the distinction is 
symbolically reinforced by the use of the national colours in both organisations 
(cf Rodriguez and Ward, 1994). Sometimes the personnel of the two 
organisations overlap at the neighbourhood level reflecting the traditional political 
practice that allows party members privileged access to those benefits which do 
trickle down to the poorer segments of society. However, in those areas where 
the local PRI is considered an obstacle or ineffective, its members are passed 
over in favour of the so-called 'natural leaders' favoured by PRONASOL, who 
are frequently those who have been active in independent organisations -
although this has not generally been the case in Guadalajara. Certainly in 
conversation with local and national leaders from all three organisations (the 
FNOC, the MT and PRONASOL), one gains a sense of the frustrations and 
jealousies. Parcero believed that the FNOC is dead and should disappear 
altogether. FNOC members at the local level in Guadalajara were not too 
worried about the MT, since its profile was low and there appeared little attempt 
to make it any greater. PRONASOL had enormous funds and no PRI elites, be 
they local or national, were going to criticise the President's central social policy 
directly, but they criticised the structures and processes it used. Furthermore, in 
the neighbourhoods things are different; many people felt betrayed by the PRI 
and confused by all the changes, considering them in the main unnecessary. 
The modernisation and democratisation slogans, which were the key words at 
the outset of the administration, were never popular in Guadalajara. The view of 
Rodriguez was that the modernisation project had failed and that the shift from 
working with unions and associations to neighbourhood groups never took off. 
The idea of a worker/peasant pact was wrong and would have been better if the 
pact had been between the CNC and CNOP. In part his negative assessment is 
due to the fact that there were far fewer independent groups in Guadalajara than 
in other urban centres. However, it also shows the degree of antagonism towards 
changes and the disparity between the centre and the regions. 
Politics in the Neighbourhoods 
Although the commitment to change at the local level may not be total, even the 
most encrusted of dinosaurs enacted party policy decisions handed down from the 
centre. Although the local Guadalajara leaders both of the PRI itself, Ricardo 
Zavala, and the FNOC, Eduardo Rodriguez, display an antipathy towards 
change, nevertheless they followed through certain 'democratisation' policies 
aimed at the grassroots of the party. As such, there have been 'capacitation' 
exercises with party members from the colonias designed to educate members 
about the history of the party and to inform them about the changes (not easy 
given the number of changes during this sexenio) and what duties and 
responsibilities they have as members of the party. Interviews were carried out 
with a quarter of the regularly participating general secretaries of the Federation 
de Colonias Populares de Jalisco (FCPJ) to ask them what they thought about the 
changes over the past five years. Individual neighbourhoods in Guadalajara have 
residents' committees where neighbours meet, generally weekly. Whilst those 
participating at the community level do not necessarily belong to the PRI, the 
general secretaries of the committees participate in the FCPJ, which is affiliated 
to the Popular Sector. During June-July 1993 there were only between 35-40 
general secretaries participating in the weekly FCPJ assemblies in contrast with 
the 80 plus who attended only two years previously (Craske, 1993). This drop in 
itself is an indication of the problems which were facing the PRI. When Zavala, 
who is General Secretary of the FCPJ as well as being the head of PRI-
Guadalajara, was asked about the drop in interest he claimed that during the time 
of the fieldwork some general secretaries had been busy with other work for the 
party and that it was inevitable that there would be a drop in participation with 
a decrease in material need.37 However, talking with the general secretaries 
themselves showed that the decrease in numbers had less to do with other 
commitments, and more to do with lack of interest and disillusionment. 
The interviews were carried out with a mixture of the old guard leaders and 
newly elected ones who had been encouraged to stand in the post-1988 period. 
What was evident from the interviews was that there had been a tightening up of 
certain democratic procedures within the neighbourhoods in terms of more 
frequent elections and defining posts in the neighbourhood executive committees 
as three year positions when previously the time was indefinite.38 This accounted 
for a number of new faces appearing over the past two years. This new 
democratic practice had extended to the executive committee of the FCPJ itself, 
which previously had been dominated by local party activists, and now had 
several representatives from the communities who were chairing the meetings, 
acting as secretary, treasurer and filling other posts. Yet beyond the level of 
appearance, there were gaps between what the party managers in Mexico City 
wanted and what was happening at the grassroots. A major problem was the 
political socialisation of the older members. The traditional way in which the 
party functioned made it very difficult for the long-term members at the base to 
adapt to the new political demands being made upon them. After years of 
'passive participation', in which they attended weekly meetings but left any 
serious political mediation to the local and regional leaders, it was not easy for 
them to be more proactive in their behaviour making demands and being subject 
to new procedures. Furthermore, given the number of changes which occurred 
over the previous five years, the members felt very uncertain about the direction 
of the sector and the party. Since the changes were decided top-down, there had 
been little opportunity for the grassroots to have a serious input. This is combined 
with their upbringing which left them ill-equipped to criticise leaders and their 
policies. Members complained about the mismanagement of the reorganisation 
and were universally critical of the idea of more reforms; they also found it very 
hard to criticise members of the party hierarchy by name, supposing they could 
identify them, for the mistakes made. 
There are evident disparities between the PRI's two camps regarding actors 
at the local neighbourhood level. The modernisers want to focus on the 'new 
leaders', who they feel are potential opposition supporters, whilst the 
traditionalists want to concentrate on stopping any disenchantment and apathy 
among long-term members. The latter feel that the old guard could become 
opposition supporters if their views are not taken into account; as Eduardo 
Rodriguez commented about the reform of the PRI, 'la democracia no respeta 
a las dirigencias'. However, even the traditionalists like Zavala acknowledge the 
need for some change. Whichever view prevails, there remains the problem of 
organisational overlap with too many PRI organisations chasing the same 
constituencies and causing confusion and resentment amongst local party 
activists. 
The General Secretaries 
The ambivalent views of the local and regional party leaders were also reflected 
in the attitudes of the grassroot members in the neighbourhoods. About thirty per 
cent of the currently participating general secretaries (in equal numbers of women 
and men) were interviewed. The questions put to the general secretaries centred 
around the changes; why did they think they had occurred, which were the most 
important, had they been successful, were more needed? Most people seemed to 
think that the changes had occurred because that is what the national leadership 
decided, although one said that there had been changes because that is what the 
grassroots decided. Sometimes this reason was linked to the problem of corrupt 
individuals (never the party) who were only concerned with their own interests 
and not the common good. Thus it was seen as a positive move in that it was an 
opportunity to shake up the system, get rid of those who had been in power 
positions for too long and to encourage new blood into the sector. Many general 
secretaries seemed to think that it was a good opportunity to reinforce democracy 
within the organisation, particularly regarding elections for the positions within 
the committee. Thus, their analysis at one level was positive, welcoming reform 
and supportive of the changes, although their concept of democracy was 
constrained to the issue of elections. 
However, there was contradiction between some of these answers and what 
they considered to be the most important changes within the sector. One 
commented that 'Los cambios han sido una tristeza; quitan la confiaaza que la 
gente tiene en los dirigentes.' One of the founding members of the FCPJ simply 
answered that there had been no good changes, although the emergence of the 
MT had potential. A new addition to the ranks of general secretary, but a long 
time priista, commented that the sector had gained nothing through change. For 
many, change represented insecurity and vulnerability. Whilst they wanted to see 
improvements in standard of living for the neighbourhoods, they did not see how 
these party reforms would achieve that. In this context, the idea of change was 
viewed suspiciously and further change was rejected. 
There was more dissent in terms of where the party was headed and what 
future changes might occur. Most members seemed uneasy about the idea of 
more change, commenting that there needed to be a time of consolidation before 
anything else happened. The only thing which was identified as needing change 
was the practice of having candidates imposed by the centre. This was an element 
of the PRI's arbitrary practices which had been reinforced during the sexenio, as 
indicated by the imposition of Sobrino in the MT and the 'solidarity' candidates. 
The antagonism towards this imposition was another illustration of the feelings 
of vulnerability at the local level. The general secretaries felt that they would not 
know the leaders if they were imposed and that they would be less able to 
influence them. So whilst part of their criticism was as a result of undemocratic 
practices, they were also concerned about the erosion of clientelistic networks. 
The change they wanted in this regard was a return to traditional networks in 
which politicians worked their way up through the party. 
Given all the changes which have occurred during the Salinas administration, 
the general secretaries seemed unsure about the structures which currently existed 
in the neighbourhood, to the point that they were unsure about the name of the 
sector to which the FCPJ was affiliated and the name of the leader at either 
national or local level. They still identified more readily with those leaders who 
were involved with the founding of the FCPJ in 1975 who have since had 
different positions within the party at city and state levels. Questions about the 
identity of the leader of the Popular Sector were answered correctly only about 
15% of the time; some mentioned Silvia Hernandez who had led the sector 
during its shift to Une, but who had ceased to be leader a year previously (one 
of the casualties when it was decided that the project had failed and FNOC 
emerged in its place). Some mentioned Ricardo Zavala or Eduardo Rodriguez as 
leaders. As far as identifying the national organisation to which the FCPJ 
belonged, the answers ranged from the PRI, the CNAPS,39 the MT, Une and 
simply the Popular Sector. This array of answers illustrates the lack of coherence 
with which the changes were made and equally the failure of the hierarchy to 
explain these changes clearly to those mobilising at the grassroots. This is a 
problem given that the party recognises the lack of informed cadres as one of its 
weaknesses. It also indicates the top-down communication flow; had the changes 
emerged more from the grassroots or been debated in assemblies, there would 
have been a deeper understanding of the changes. The response of Zavala's 
colleagues about the confusion amongst the general secretaries tends to be that 
they were dealing with people with little education, ignoring the fact that 
generally they were people who had many years experience with the party. If 
they were unequipped to deal with the changes, that reflected as much upon the 
modus operandi of the party and the failure of the capacitacion exercises as on 
the calibre of the general secretaries themselves. 
Wider Issues 
The general secretaries were also asked about political issues outside the 
reorganisation of the Popular Sector. This included their opinions about 
PRONASOL, NAFTA and the concept of 'modernisation'. These issues give an 
impression of how the principal projects of this administration were received by 
party members who were divorced from the decision-making process. On the 
whole, the general secretaries seemed antipathetic towards these policies, 
particularly towards NAFTA and the notion of modernisation generally. 
The whole project of PRONASOL was seen in two ways by priistas: either as 
another resource for the party to use, or as a way of ousting old party stalwarts 
who were no longer considered efficient activists. Below, we will discuss the 
views of the Head of PRONASOL in Jalisco, Jose Luis Mata Bracamontes. 
However, we will first assess how the programme functioned in the very 
neighbourhoods on which it was targeted. 
The views of the general secretaries in the neighbourhoods mirrored the two 
opinions outlined above. Indeed, for many of the general secretaries the PRI and 
PRONASOL were one and the same thing. They worked together and frequently 
the same people participated in both committees; in the words of one, 'La misma 
gente participa en los dos comites; puros priistas en todos\ On the whole the 
programme was seen as being a benefit to the communities, especially the poorer 
ones which were in greater need of basic services. Two general secretaries cited 
PRONASOL as one of the biggest successes of the sexenio. When considering 
the activities of PRONASOL at the municipality level, they thought that it was 
very useful, particularly for the poorer communities. However, this positive 
assessment of the programme was not universal. Some general secretaries 
thought that Pronasol was in direct competition with the residents' committees 
and that individuals had hijacked the committee for their own ends. Whilst 
PRONASOL was most strongly identified with service provision in poor 
neighbourhoods, there was a second element which was the productive side. This 
was an area which was considered to have failed. 
At the municipal level one general secretary criticised the notion that 
PRONASOL had been of particular assistance in Sector Reforma which had 
suffered devastating damage in the wake of the 22 April explosion. He believed 
that the municipal authority rather than PRONASOL had responded to the 
crisis.40 There was no mention made of Mujeres en Solidaridad, which is more 
active in rural areas, but many made mention of the schools projects (Escuela 
Digna) although it was suggested that the work would have been carried out 
anyway under a different name. Members of independent organisations 
commented that the Escuela Digna project was executed in a very authoritarian 
manner with demands being made upon them with little consultation. 
The general secretaries had a positive attitude towards the programme, but 
they also considered it a PRI project and that they should have had privileged 
access to its benefits. It seemed automatic that the same people should participate 
in the two organisations: the PRI is government and the government is the PRI. 
However, although they were not hostile to PRONASOL, neither did they claim 
that their communities had benefited much from it. On the whole, Guadalajara 
seems to have had less attention from the programme than might be expected 
(Craske, 1993) until the explosions in April 1992, although the state of Jalisco 
benefited despite being one of the richer states (Rodriguez, 1993). 
This positive attitude to government projects does not extend to their views on 
NAFTA. The most constructive comment that the general secretaries could make 
was to hope that it would work out well and to consider the possibility that it 
would create more jobs; however, they believed that what benefits were to come 
would be concentrated in the northern states. Most were concerned that NAFTA 
would prejudice Mexico at the expense of the USA; as one said: 
'A Mexico le falta gente capacitada, e inversion nacional. Los empresarios no 
invierten en renovar maquinaria debido a los altos impuestos del gobierno. Mexico 
no esta listo para entrar en un tratado asi, ni en las fabricas ni en el campo'. 
This negative assessment was supported by local officials; Zavala considered that 
there would be benefits stemming from NAFTA, but that they would not filter 
through to the poorer segments of society for some years. He predicted at least 
six years, and maybe not even then. Similarly the assessment of Eduardo 
Rodriguez was sober, suggesting that this was something for the elite and those 
in the north and Mexico City. 
PRONASOL and NAFTA are two elements of the modernisation project of the 
Salinas administration. So what does 'modernisation' mean to the general 
secretaries? To several, nothing at all. As one put it, 'no la aclaran bien lo que 
quieran... falta de atencion a lo antiguo; deben de caminar a mano.' Others 
related it to the changes in the economy, particularly neo-liberal economic 
policies and the free trade agreement which they doubted would benefit them.41 
For one, modernisation referred to the country's deeper insertion into the world 
capitalist system but added, 'en mi colonia no se nota la modernization; nosfalta 
cos as culturales.' The worry was that modernisation was going to marginalise 
certain aspects of Mexican culture and that in developing the modernising project 
they should 'tomar en cuenta la economia y cultura de Mexico'. Modernisation, 
in tandem with NAFTA, was considered as privileging big business at the 
expense of local companies and businesses; this is of particular concern to people 
of Guadalajara, a city that is dominated by small businesses. 
The general secretaries felt that they had more influence in traditional 
clientelistic relationships. This allowed them greater familiarity with different 
power brokers and they were more able to develop personal contacts. For them, 
democratisation meant people coming up through the ranks and achieving office 
from which the general secretaries could benefit personally, rather than open 
elections which could give influence to people outside the committees and give 
an opening to 'inexperienced' people. This, it was felt, benefited people who had 
not proven their loyalty to the system and who therefore could not be trusted. For 
the general secretaries, the democratisation promoted by the modernisers meant 
a loss of influence and access to benefits and thus eroded their own power in the 
communities, hence the antipathy. This different attitude to what democratisation 
means accounts for the different degrees of opening evident at the local level. 
The most important thing to the local activists was preserving their power bases, 
which meant that some democratisation measures might be supported while others 
were rejected. However, in the three years since I began field work with the 
FCPJ, the number of general secretaries participating has more than halved. The 
situation in Guadalajara is all the more complicated due to the 1992 explosions 
and the assassination of the Cardinal in May 1993. These two events have 
reinforced criticism of the PRI because of the aftermath of the events rather than 
the events themselves. 
PRONASOL in Guadalajara 
PRONASOL has been a key strategy in the region, as might be expected. Despite 
the lack of wide-ranging popular protest activities in the 1980s, Jalisco, one of 
the federation's wealthier states, has benefited well from the programme 
(Rodriguez, 1993). However, the organisation of PRONASOL in the state has 
not been smooth and in many ways the tensions which have emerged, particularly 
around the disaster relief project in the wake of the 1992 explosions, are typical 
of the local-centre divide reflected in Eckstein's study (Eckstein, 1990). She 
comments that local level decentralisation was the crux of the regime's 
democratisation plans after 1988. Given that decentralisation was key to the 
Salinas administration's understanding of democratisation (Rodriguez, 1993) and 
the antagonism of local authorities to this, the example of Guadalajara after April 
1992 is a salient one. 
PRONASOL functions through both state and federal bodies. As the state 
capital, Guadalajara has both federal and state PRONASOL offices.42 However, 
until the April 1992 explosions, the federal body had not been able to gain a 
foothold in Guadalajara. The local-centre tensions, which had been mounting up 
throughout the country, were brought into sharp relief in a very public manner 
in the aftermath of the explosions. Within hours, Salinas was in Guadalajara 
promising to give all possible federal assistance to the local agencies to help with 
the relief operation, but rather than liaise with these he addressed his attentions 
directly to the victims, thus undermining the authority of the local politicians and 
agencies, in particular the state governor, Guillermo Cosio Vidaurri, and the 
municipal president, Enrique Dau Flores. Soon the two PRONASOL agencies 
became parallel rather than complementary organisations, reflecting the different 
styles of government; Lomeli (1993) identifies the state agency with more 
authoritarian styles of organisations, which attempted to control popular 
participation in decision-making, whilst the federal agencies allowed those 
affected to have much more autonomy in the process. Consequently, the federal 
agencies were able to promote a democratising image, which was juxtaposed 
against the more autocratic style of the regional authorities, further undermining 
the governor and other local officials. Despite the differences between the two 
branches, the victims of the disaster identified PRONASOL with the PRI and saw 
the political consequences of PRONASOL: 'consideran que el partido utiliza el 
programa de Solidaridad para revitalizarse, para incrementar sus afiliados y 
recobrar legitimidad. A su juicio, las acciones de Solidaridad tienen como 
objetivo la recomposicion y modernization del partido oficial.' (Lomeli, 1993, p. 
242). This lack of distinction between the programme and the party is a reflection 
of the general secretaries' views above and indicates that the intertwining of the 
two is not discouraged by either organisation. 
The case of the relief effort shows the gap between the two factions within the 
party and also the tight linking between the party and PRONASOL, to the extent 
that the different branches of PRONASOL reflect the political structures. Federal 
bureaucracy promoted local level decentralisation, the inclusion of 'natural 
leaders' and greater autonomy for grassroots organisations. In comparison, the 
state bodies pursued a more authoritarian line, where control of possible 
independent political activity was a key consideration; this was seen as 
particularly important since many independent organisations were also active in 
the disaster zone and were lending their expertise in the demand-making process. 
The attitude of the local agencies was also evident in the handling of the relief 
effort. Very soon after the explosion, Cosio Vidaurri and Dau Flores ordered 
heavy digging equipment to be sent in to clear the damaged area. This effectively 
stopped residents from salvaging any personal goods, but more importantly it 
stopped the search for people who might have been still alive. Consequently, 
even those who believe that Cosio Vidaurri was a scapegoat are critical of his use 
of heavy machinery, which reflected a lack of sensitivity in dealing with the 
issue.43 In this case, the federal authorities won the day with the ousting of Cosio 
and Dau Flores, although the interim governor, Carlos Rivera Arceves, was not 
known for being a moderniser. According to the state PRONASOL boss, Mata 
Bracamontes, the tensions between the two branches of PRONASOL were 
resolved when an independent body was set up to oversee the disaster relief. 
However, the modus operandi of the state body remains locked in a traditionalist 
perspective where old practices of clientelism and authoritarianism are 
reinforced. 
As the modernisation project develops, the rhetorical commitment to 
democratisation has permeated virtually all levels. Consequently, even in those 
bodies resistant to change, the language of the bureaucrats reflects the reformist 
venture. The head of PRONASOL in Jalisco, Jose Luis Mata Bracamontes, is a 
long-time member of the party, whose father was instrumental in the setting up 
of the Popular Sector of which he is a member in his professional capacity.44 He 
is well known amongst many of the general secretaries and local officials as a 
party activist. Like many in Guadalajara, he acknowledges the problems in the 
PRI and sees change as the only option, but is also less enthusiastic about radical 
change than his counterparts in Mexico City. He welcomes active participation 
in the setting up of projects, believing that this reinforces a sense of community, 
but he is also wary of what a fuller democratisation would mean. He represents 
the 'new' PRI inasmuch as he talks about forging new communities built on co-
responsibility and seems genuinely committed to PRONASOL, but the 
functioning of his office remains steeped in traditions of clientelism and 
cooptation. Many of those working in his team made it clear that they saw the 
programme as being directed towards PRI communities and activists to strengthen 
the party.45 
Mata Bracamontes accepts the need for change and a different relationship 
between party and society, requiring a separation of the party from the state. He 
is aware of certain key areas which need reform: first the party itself; secondly, 
the need for the government to respond to its citizens in a more consistent 
manner; thirdly, a reduction in paternalism and clientelism. Having identified 
these as areas in need of change, he went on to express solutions. He focused on 
services as a key area and one where the ad hoc development of state agencies 
had created problems that aided protest organisations - very much reflecting the 
language of Colosio in 1989 (Cornelius et al 1989)) - and saw PRONASOL as 
a solution to the chaotic situation which reigned prior to 1988. He also accepted 
that the success of PRONASOL was reflected in votes for the PRI, but denies 
that this is the priority. 
When asked about modernisation, he identified three main elements: the 
development of a legal framework that would regulate municipal activities; the 
strengthening of the technical expertise of the municipalities so that they might 
be more capable of raising and managing their own funds; and finally the training 
of the populace so that people can understand their rights and responsibilities 
according to the law. Thus, his assessment reinforces the view that 
'modernisation' is concentrated at the level of municipalities rather than larger 
national questions of accountability. From these responses we can see that his 
assessment of the problems fits well into the modernisers' vision, but he also 
demonstrates sympathy with more traditionalist politicians when he takes a very 
cautious stand on the possibility of effecting change in Jalisco. 
He is particularly critical of the way in which the old practices of clientelism 
and populism have continued and he sees increased popular participation as useful 
for cutting through the clientelistic networks. Yet, when he explains the 
functioning of PRONASOL it is evident that the system functions in much the 
same way. He acknowledges the tradition of caudillismo where grassroots 
members look for strong leaders who will act as conduits between the group and 
the authorities; in general, independent organisations have tended to reflect this 
individual dominance as well (Craske, 1993). This detracts from the participatory 
principle promoted by PRONASOL. The forming of the Solidarity committees 
also erodes the development of grassroot organisations that encourage the full 
participation of all. Mata Bracamontes comments that it is easy to form these 
committees when promotores are going into the communities with resources and 
wish to identify key local activists to develop projects; it is at this point that links 
are frequently made with existing PRI organisers such as the FCPJ general 
secretaries that consequently reinforce traditional political practices. 
A further problem is that many of the promises regarding PRONASOL 
projects have been made on the campaign trail, clearly linking PRI candidates 
with PRONASOL and its benefits. This demonstrates the clientelism to which the 
programme contributes, as well as fostering the system of individual leaders and 
making them more important than due process, with the consequent reinforcing 
of caudillismo. Finally, Mata Bracamontes also revealed that he considered 
democratisation a great risk, since a country full of citizens who know their 
rights could be destabilising and agreement hard to find. 
Despite the packaging of PRONASOL as part of the democratisation project, 
evidence in support of this is patchy. The general secretaries interviewed 
certainly saw it as an extension of the PRI with the privileges that it conferred on 
good priistas. The experiences in the aftermath of the 1992 explosions reflected 
the view that there have been progressive elements at work, but these are easily 
compensated for by the more reactionary forces. In my own work in the 
neighbourhoods among independent activists there were many complaints about 
the project. These included contributions being demanded for them, particularly 
regarding the Escuela Digna programme for renovating school buildings; a 
repeated complaint was that, despite the propaganda, their contribution was most 
frequently financial rather than in kind. Another complaint was the way in which 
the paving of the colonia was carried out; a contract was given to residents 
stating the amount to be paid, in six monthly instalments, ranging from one to 
three million (old) pesos (approximately £500-1,500) which was greatly in excess 
of what could be afforded. One group refused to sign the contract, and thus did 
not enter into an agreement with the local authorities, but their section of road 
was still paved. At the time of the fieldwork the issue had not been resolved, but 
it indicated the problem of pursuing 'co-responsibility' in all projects. A final 
complaint is that there was often a hazy distinction between what the municipal 
authorities were providing and what was distributed under the auspices of 
PRONASOL; this complaint came both from priistas and independent activists.46 
It is clear that Pronasol was involved in projects which communities want. 
However, it is equally clear that there was an overlap between its task and the 
tasks of other organisations. This should not be a problem since one is a 
government project and the other two, FNOC and MT, are PRI organisations. 
However, since most priistas believed that they should have privileged access to 
PRONASOL funds, they felt marginalised and pushed to one side. On the whole, 
it appears that in Guadalajara at least PRONASOL more often served as an extra 
resource for the party than as a tool to promote democratisation. Yet, given that 
the MT is designed to group together all organisations interested in gestion 
social, including opposition groups and solidarity committees, where does this 
leave the distinction between MT and Pronasol which also purports to deal with 
opposition, PRI and non-affiliated groups equally? From the Guadalajara 
experience it would seem that PRONASOL has done little to break away from 
the traditional PRI practices of clientelism, arbitrariness and the lack of the clear 
rule of law; indeed, some evidence points to the contrary. It might have laudable 
principles, but it is finding it difficult to put them into practice. 
At the local level, PRONASOL has still been based on differentiated sectoral 
activities and few horizontal linkages have been formed. So whilst we see an 
attempt made at encouraging mass participation in the process of service 
distribution (which does not take into account the other areas where PRONASOL 
is active), this attempt is hardly touching the surface, if the information from 
Guadalajara is generalisable. The new structures which PRONASOL has been 
promoting have largely been superimposed on already existing PRI organisations. 
The post-explosion organisation is representative of the modernised corporatism, 
whilst the PRONASOL committees in other neighbourhoods have frequently 
become synonymous with the PRI. In Mexico City they seem to ignore the 
problem of how things are functioning on the ground, dismissing the entrenched 
nature of clientelism and caudillos, and indeed promoting practices which 
reinforce these if necessary. 
Conclusions 
That there were changes during the Salinas sexenio is not in doubt, but what is 
less clear is the direction these changes have taken. Cornelius et al identified six 
possible reform models in 1989, indicating the range of possibilities as well as 
taking into account that reform might have no particular trajectory; looking back 
over the sexenio, the most prevalent outcome has been the modernisation of 
authoritarianism. 1988 was a watershed year in Mexican politics, but despite the 
clear indication that the PRI was under attack and was being forced to liberalise 
the political system, it was equally obvious that the PRI should not be written off 
as a political force. In this paper, I have argued that the need for political reform 
was accepted by virtually all within the party, but the options for change had to 
be decided from a continuum ranging from a radical overhaul of the party, 
whereby the party would shed its corporatist identity and become a party of 
individuals competing in a pluralist system, to an approach which reinforces the 
party as a terrain of corporatism and reasserts its privileged position in the 
distribution of resources. The development of the Mexican political system has 
never been unilinear, but has been continuously renegotiated vis-a-vis society. 
The recent changes result from pressures being exerted upon it by opposition 
parties, internal shifts and popular protest organisations among other things. 
Here I have argued that the pressures have not remained constant and several 
issues have come into play that have influenced the course of political reform. 
Salinas began with a progressive discourse, particularly centred on the notion of 
decentralisation and co-responsibility, which acknowledged the need to 
'decorporatise' the party. However, this was prompted as much by economic 
considerations, particularly with NAFTA in mind, as by political factors. This 
reformist project was never assured from the beginning, and, as we have seen, 
it was increasingly strained as different factions within the party jockeyed for 
positionn. It is not possible to know exactly what Salinas had in mind with his 
reform project and, since he confronted many challenges, it was always a risky 
strategy trying to push through party reform with an attack on entrenched 
militants. However, what we can detect is a firm path steered in many areas 
demonstrating that democratisation was not a priority but rather a useful tactic to 
promote other policies. Indeed, the very form of 'democratisation', through 
enforced local decentralisation and the functioning of PRONASOL, was to 
consolidate centralised decision-making and therefore authoritarianism. His 
handling of many issues, from the ousting of local politicians, outlawing workers' 
strikes and coopting independent organisations, belies the democratisation 
argument and indicates a reassertion of authoritarian strategies. 
Along with these clear authoritarian tendencies, we also see the reinforcement 
of corporatism and the control of popular participation which this entails, 
particularly at the lower levels of organisation. However, it appears that the fate 
of the PRI itself is uncertain. The failure to make serious changes during this 
sexenio as a result of the struggles between the 'dinosaurs' and the modernisers 
could be an indication that attempts to reform the PRI will cease and the party 
will be allowed to wither away in time with only the old school left on the inside. 
Despite many reform attempts, particularly in the Popular Sector and the 
focusing on social issues, the Salinas sexenio ended with virtually the same party 
structures as in 1988. Even the new project of the Movimiento Territorial has 
failed to make an impact - particularly in cities like Guadalajara. 
As the party crumbles, PRONASOL has been strengthened and has become 
increasingly institutionalised with the hope of incorporating as many 'natural 
leaders' and independent political organisations as possible. Although women are 
not seen as being as politically threatening as they were in 1988, when they 
contributed greatly to the popular protest organisations, they continue to be an 
important part of PRONASOL and an indication of the project's democratic 
credentials seems to be gauged by the success of Mujeres en Solidaridad; 
incorporating women is a measure of openness and modernity! However, the 
drop in attention towards women is another indication of how the regime 
responds only to pressure not principle. The facade of democratisation could also 
be maintained by allowing continued access to PRONASOL funds to opposition 
local governments in a limited and strategic way. PRONASOL has been very 
successful in attracting independent activists, many of whom now work as 
promotores and who attest to the positive effects of the programme. But there are 
distinct signs that the programme reinforces many of the anti-democratic 
practices of old, whilst incorporating many new features that reduce costs to the 
government without expanding access to services, and more importantly decision-
making, to a wider group. There is a continuation of clientelism and caudillismo 
and those who have greatest access to the programme appear not the be the 
poorest but the best organised. 
As shown, PRONASOL has modernised corporatism by refocusing the vertical 
structures on new issues, shifting away from politically sensitive areas such as 
labour relations and land reform which remain the preserve of the CTM and 
CNC respectively, and by the notion of co-responsibility. But the collegiate style, 
emphasised by Parcero and others, is hard to detect at the local level. 
Consequently, functionally differentiated and vertically structured organisations 
still permeate political organisation. There is no indication that there is increased 
accountability of local representatives, the decision-making process is highly 
centralised and it is very difficult to gauge what criteria are pertinent since 
decisions remain highly arbitrary and secretive. As the party stands in 1994, 
many activists at the grassroots are disillusioned and the effectiveness of its 
organisation must be under question. Talking to the general secretaries in 
Guadalajara clearly showed that they felt pressure from the party rather than 
from opposition groups in the neighbourhoods - perhaps this is an indication of 
how successful the party has been in coopting opposition organisation. But in 
1988 many priistas defected to the FDN or abstained so the continued support of 
grassroots activists cannot be taken for granted, particularly with the current 
strength of the PAN. 
Reforming the PRI has always been a gargantuan task and it remains a moot 
point whether it could function in a pluralist system. It is clear that many 
elements within the party fear becoming a 'modern' party premised on 
individuals rather than mass organisations. Those who fear it more tend to be the 
regional bosses who have little to gain from liberalisation. However, another 
major obstacle to party reform is the grassroots itself. The image of the party that 
the membership have is at odds with the party hierarchy. They have become used 
to a party which functions in a non-transparent way where personal relationships 
and contacts are the norm. Playing by the rules may not be in their best interests 
and since much of what is coming from the centre benefits them very little, it is 
not surprising that we do not see overwhelming support from the grassroots. 
Also, given the culture of clientelism and caudillismo, it seems difficult to 
develop a 'societal' corporatist system along West European lines; the 'bottom-
up' organisations that have emerged are now being dragged into the fold via 
PRONASOL rather than the party or repressed. In many ways PRONASOL is 
beginning to mirror party development, in that there are progressive elements but 
with massive regional variations where authoritarian enclaves have absorbed the 
new project. Corporatism need not be anti-democratic if certain criteria are 
respected such as the rule of law, transparent elections and accountable 
representatives, but there is no indication that the Mexican political system is 
ready to take these on board. The desire for First World status appears to be 
resting solely on economic performance, although the investigation into human 
rights abuses in Chiapas might give the government the opportunity to prove 
otherwise. 
The party has regained some popular support since its nadir in 1988, but this 
support is not deeply entrenched, leaving the party vulnerable to extraneous 
events such as the 1992 explosions, the death of Guadalajara's archbishop and the 
January uprising in Chiapas where the demands of the rebels gained widespread 
national support. The Salinas administration gave mixed signals with both 
liberalisation and entrenchment evident, but the underlying trend has been a 
reinforcement of central authority, continued arbitrariness and discretion in 
decision-making, increased personalism, continued electoral reform in an attempt 
to bolster the PRI and a lack of popular influence in policy-making from party 
reform to NAFTA. No serious attempt has been made to undermine corporatism; 
instead, we have a dual corporatist project where one, the PRI has been waning 
and the other, PRONASOL has been in the ascendancy. Party reform was not 
prioritised by Salinas and an opportunity for change was lost. Under the new 
adminstration of President Zedillo, it seems unlikely that party reform will be any 
more successful. The 1994 elections have shown how little the political system 
has changed during the Salinas sexenio with corruption, fraud and clientelism still 
important. There are indications that there has been a degree of opening, but in 
a controlled manner and only in one direction (towards an accommodation with 
the PAN). It is difficult to characterise this as democratisation.47 
In conclusion, it seems that no group within the PRI really wants to dismantle 
corporatism, rather they want to make the corporatist structures more responsive 
to their set of priorities - be that modernising the economy or reinforcing 
caudillismo. For all concerned, the control of the masses through efficient socio-
political structures is still a useful way of doing that. Yet the structures had 
stagnated by 1988 and the lack of real change since then would indicate that there 
is still trouble ahead for the party. A key difference between the two camps is 
their attitude to the party itself. For the modernisers, the PRI represents a means 
to an end and consequently it is only useful whilst it is efficient. For the 
traditionalists, the party is an end in itself in terms of power and careers and thus 
needs no changes while they can continue to manipulate electoral outcomes; and 
August 1994 indicates that they can. 
Appendix A 
The Structure of Movimiento Territorial 
To establish the organisation an open meeting was called in the neighbourhoods 
to form a Grassroots Social Committee (Comite Social de Base) so that all 
individuals and groups involved in gestion social might attend. The hierarchy 
believe the results have been good; since they have open elections they have been 
seen as more credible (creible) and they have avoided designating committee 
members. The five people with the highest votes form the executive committee 
(mesa directiva) and take joint decisions. The structure is horizontal; everybody 
who participates forms part of the council of the grassroots committee (consejo 
de comite de base). For every 100 voters the group has the right to send a 
delegate to sit on the municipal level executive committee. There need to be at 
least 50 people to call a neighbourhood assembly. There is a cumulative effect: 
the municipal executive can send two members to the state level assembly, 
likewise two members from each state go to the national directive council 
(organo de direction nacional). The National Congress has two representatives 
from each municipality. The Standing Commission (Comision Permanente) also 
has two members for each state, i.e. 64 members. Everything is based on a 
collegiate system, including the work commissions which decide and carry out 
projects in the neighbourhoods. The links are horizontal in an attempt to avoid 
dependence on central resource distribution. 
Notes 
1. Ernesto Zedillo claimed victory with only 15% of the votes counted. 
2. That is, Salinas won 50.36% of 55% of registered voters leaving him with 
27.7% of the electorate supporting him. This does not account for those who had 
not registered to vote. Furthermore, the PRI failed to win its usual two-thirds 
majority needed for making constitutional amendments; the 1988-1991 legislature 
is the only one in which the PRI has not had this advantage, which resulted in 
political alliances with the right-wing PAN in order to make constitutional 
amendments. 
3. The failure was all the more embarrassing since traditional leaders such as 
Jonguitud Barros of the teachers' union had promised to turn out eight million 
votes for the PRI. In the event the teachers defected in large numbers to the 
FDN. 
4. The debate surrounding the links between reform of the system and reform 
of the party has been going on for some time. Lorenzo Meyer has suggested that 
perhaps reforming the PRI is a 'mission impossible' (Meyer, 1989). 
5. This desire is illustrated by Mexico's successful application to join the OECD 
and the signing of NAFTA. 
6. These tensions within the party are amply illustrated over the party's 
presidential nomination for the 1994 elections. First, there was the tension 
between Colosio and Camacho Solis that highlights the tensions between the two 
factions; although both had good relations equally with the President and the 
party, Camacho originally came out in defence of the corporate structures, albeit 
a reformed version. Since the events in Chiapas in January 1994, he has been 
seen increasingly as a moderniser in favour or radical democratisation policies 
which resulted in him overshadowing the then presidential candidate before his 
untimely death. After Colosio's assassination in March 1994, the decision over 
who should replace him indicated further tensions between the party faithful and 
the hierarchy. In the end the economist Zedillo won out over the party choice of 
Ortiz Arana, signalling the continuation of the neo-liberal economic project. In 
order to gain more support within the party, Zedillo courted the hardliners. 
7. There were several changes of General Secretary during the course of this 
administration. 
8. Whilst I do not wish to overdraw the dualism of reformers/traditionalists 
equals Mexico City/the regions, in the case of Guadalajara, where the fieldwork 
was carried out, the local priistas are more strongly represented by the 
traditionalists and the modernising policies are seen as coming from a clique 
close to the President in Mexico City. 
9. Jonathan Fox describes authoritarian clientelism as a situation 'where 
imbalanced bargaining relations require the enduring political subordination of 
clients and are reinforced by the threat of coercion' (1994, p. 153). 
10. GDP growth slowed in the second half of the sexenio, dropping to only 
0.4% in 1993, consequently throwing the government's forecasts off balance; the 
recession continued despite renewed buoyancy in the USA. Another problem has 
been how to change speculative capital into productive investment (Barkin, 
1992). 
11. This is obviously not intended to be an exhaustive list of the changes and 
reforms undertaken by the Salinas Administration, but only those most relevant 
for this paper. 
12. Convenios are agreements reached by the in-coming administration with 
some of the more powerful popular protest organisations with the view to 
undermining potential alliances with the newly formed PRD; one such case is the 
agreement between the government and the Comite de Defensa Popular de 
Durango (CDP) which has since won regional level representation (Haber, 1993). 
Eckstein identifies a similar convenio between the government and the 1985 
earthquake victims, commenting that although the recipients of aid were no 
longer expected to affiliated to the party, they nevertheless lose their social bases 
(1990). 
13. The PRD in particular has suffered with large numbers of its members being 
harassed and several have been killed, particularly in rural areas. Journalists and 
lawyers involved in human rights cases have also been subject to repression and 
ultimately death. The CNDH may have the chance to show its worth in the 
investigations into human rights abuses in the early days of the Chiapas uprising 
in January 1994. 
14. Only the PAN has had its governorship wins recognised in the states of Baja 
California, Chihuahua and Guanajuato (as an interim) whilst the PRD failed to 
have its claims of victory accepted. In 1989 the Michoacan state legislature was 
elected on the same day as the Baja California gubernatorial elections. The PRD 
was awarded six out of eighteen seats. However, many believe that it won at least 
another eight seats and that in the remaining four fraud was so bad that it was 
impossible to say who had won them. Similarly in 1992 the governorship election 
was held the same day as the Chihuahua election and again it appears that 
widespread fraud was used, which was not the case in the PAN stronghold. 
15. Tarres illustrates the non-democratic credentials of 'a significant minority' 
of PAN supporters in the Mexico City suburb of El Satelite where between 25 
and 37 per cent said 'that left-wing party militants, illiterates, the unemployed, 
and the indigenous population did not have the same political rights (afforded the 
rest of society)' (1990, p. 146, emphasis in the original). 
16. Jeffrey Rubin argues that corporatism had never been especially effective in 
Juchitan, Oaxaca, allowing the first left-wing municipal government to take 
power in the 1970s when the COCEI (Coalition Obrera Campesina Estudiantil 
del Istmo) won the elections (Rubin, 1990). However, it was not allowed to 
remain in power long. 
17. The CTM leader's attempts at thwarting party reform encouraged some 
members of the Corriente Democratico to threaten resignation whilst other 
priistas joined the Corriente (Morris, 1992, p. 40). The XIV party assembly in 
1990 was characterised by these issues. 
18. Given that the tensions between the two camps are frequently drawn along 
centre-region distinctions (footnote 8 notwithstanding), governors have a strategic 
importance since they 'can resist reform efforts in the name of federalism' (Fox, 
1994, p. 175). Thus, they can be a key resource for the traditionalists resulting 
in a number of removals by the president including Jalisco and Tabasco. It is 
also worth noting that the interior minister, who was removed in the aftermath 
of the Zapatista uprising in January 1994, was a former governor of Chiapas 
renowned for his hardline attitudes. 
19. The latest round of electoral reforms in 1994 did change funding regulations, 
but have yet to have any real impact. The most radical change was the imposition 
of ceilings on campaign expenditure. However, the ceilings were way above what 
any of the opposition parties could afford anyway. 
20. The PRI has many names for residents' committees: comites de vecinos, and 
juntas de mejoras being two used in the Guadalajara Metropolitan Zone (ZMG). 
21. The other two were a faction within the official SNTE the Coordinadora 
Nacional de Trabajadores de la Education (CNTE) and the Coordinadora 
Nacional 'Plan Ayala' (CNPA), a peasant organisation. All three had been 
founded during 1979-1980. 
22. This is not to say that there was not an exchange between the two experiences 
and the identity-centred approach of the social movements theoreticians has 
proved to be useful in the analysis of popular movements in Mexico (see 
Foweraker and Craig, 1990, for examples). 
23. Interview with Dra Cecilia Ruiz, Secretary of New Social Movements of the 
Federation of Popular Organisations of Jalisco (FOPJ) 1989. 
24. This is a document published by the PRI simply entitled Movimiento 
Territorial given to me by Arq. Jose Parcero Lopez. It does not appear in the 
Bibliography. 
25. Interview with the author 1 July 1993. 
26. The Residents' Committees, which are currently members of the FNOC in 
Jalisco, fall outside the formal structure of the sector, but are incorporated as 
'extraordinary' members. 
27. Information from an interview with Jose Parcero Lopez 1 July 1993. 
28. This will be discussed below in relation to Guadalajara. 
29. Yucatan was at the centre of some controversy in early summer 1993 over 
plans to reschedule the gubernatorial elections. The PAN had had considerable 
success here and it was quite possible that the incumbent mayor of Merida, 
panista Ana Rosa Payan would run for, and quite possibly win, the seat. The 
elections coincided with the 1994 presidential elections and as such were 
considered a potential rallying point for the opposition. The solution for the PRI 
was to bring forward the governorship elections to November 1993. It was hoped 
that the rescheduling of the elections would detract from the PAN's support and 
in the event blatant fraud was used against the PAN. This use of fraud, given that 
the PAN 'had been cooperating closely with the government since 1989, was 
particularly shocking' (Cornelius, 1994, p. 58). 
30. This is in contrast with what the programme identifies as 'traditional politics' 
consisting of vertical organisations, sectoral concerns, macro-level agreements, 
depersonalised treatment and sectoral units (Programa Estrategico). 
31. During the few years of the Salinas administration there was a team of 
priistas who researched the literature on social movements and displayed an 
impressive grasp of the issues developed by researcher/activists such as Ramirez 
Saiz and Pedro Moctezuma. I believe this to be a key feature of the party's 
ability to undermine popular organisations. 
32. Ex-General Secretary of the Popular Sector, Lie. Silvia Hernandez, 
commented privately that a study carried out by the PRI indicated that the 
PRONASOL was actually damaging the party electorally. This study was 
repressed by Salinas and Hernandez now regrets that it was never published. 
33. See Cornelius et al (1994) for a collection of essays with various 
interpretations of its significance. 
34. Rather than resigning, both men asked for licence to be absent from duties 
for an indefinite period. In this way new elections were avoided. 
35. In a country where conspiracy theories abound, many blamed the death on 
the PRI itself, suggesting the Cardinal was too involved in politics and planned 
to support the establishment of a Christian Democrat party. Others thought that 
he would become the next Cardinal of Mexico City; as a supposed sympathiser 
of the right, this would not please many in the PRI. These criticisms of a lack of 
a credible investigation were echoed a year later when Colosio was assassinated 
in Tijuana - a town where again drugs could be a useful smokescreen. 
36. Although maybe not as clearly as he had anticipated. He believed that the 
subsequent National Assembly of the Popular Sector would dissolve the 'citizen 
network' within the Sector, which is synonymous with the modernisers' 
influence; in the event it failed to do this, indicating that the modernisers still 
have some influence. 
37. It is worth noting that, prior to his appointment as leader of the party in 
Guadalajara, Zavala had been Director of Participation Ciudadana, a department 
within City Hall in charge of coordinating the distribution of services to 
neighbourhoods within the municipality of Guadalajara. This allowed highly 
discretionary decisions to be made to the advantage of those participating in the 
FCPJ as part of a cooptation strategy to isolate independent organisations 
(Craske, 1993). 
38. There appears to be no set structure to the neighbourhood committees, with 
the executive positions ranging from three to about ten. The only common 
positions seem to be general secretary, treasurer, secretary and women's officer, 
although this latter position is rarely filled. 
39. The Coalition Nacional de Agrupaciones Productivas y de Servicios; a 
constituent member of the FNOC. Whilst the FCPJ is a member of FNOC, it is 
an extraordinary member since it does not fit into one of the three branches: see 
Figure 5 above. 
40. PRONASOL's involvement in the clear-up operation resulted in problems 
for the programme itself, leading to rows between the regional PRONASOL and 
federal PRONASOL leaders - both of whom had offices in Guadalajara: see 
below in section on PRONASOL. 
41. It is worth noting that the anti-NAFTA sentiments of the Zapatista rebels 
active in southern Mexico in early 1994 were supported by the majority of the 
population, according to many opinion polls in the press at the time. 
42. This paragraph draws on Lomeli 1993. 
43. It was also rumoured that Cosio owned the heavy machinery used in the relief 
operation and therefore would have benefited financially from their use. 
44. Two interviews were conducted with Mata Bracamontes in June 1993 from 
which the following information is derived. 
45. These impressions were not assuaged when the promised figures regarding 
PRONASOL spending in Jalisco and how the funds were distributed were not 
forthcoming despite many promises. 
46. I was given the official records for expenditure by the Guadalajara 
municipality during the Covarrubias Ibarra administration (1989-92). It may be 
worth noting that Covarrubias warned against seeing PRONASOL as a panacea 
for all situations of service provision in the neighbourhoods. It would be 
interesting to see if both bodies claimed to be funding the same projects, given 
that many local neighbourhood organisations (including local PRI members) 
seemed to think that this was the case. 
47. Many observers point to a pact between the PAN and the PRI in which the 
PAN plays the role of loyal opposition in return for positions in government such 
as the governorships. The PAN's presidential candidate, Fernando Diego de 
Cevallos, made a strong showing in opinion polls leading up to the elections, 
particularly after the televised debate between the main candidates in May, but 
towards the end of the campaign he became very lacklustre and accepted 
Zedillo's claims of victory almost immediately despite his reservations about the 
electoral process. Today more than ever a modern system of manipulation of the 
news, of deformation of the truth, of falsification of information was used' 
(quoted in The Independent, 23 August 1994). These criticisms are considerably 
stronger than those expressed by Cardenas. 
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